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Tämä pro gradu -tutkielma käsittelee uskonnonvapauden toteutumista suomalaisissa peruskouluissa. Tarkoituksena on selvittää 
miten Suomi noudattaa kansainvälisten ihmisoikeuksien ja perustuslain vaatimuksia. Tutkielma sisältää tiiviin katsauksen uskon-
nonvapauteen ihmis- ja perusoikeutena, erityisesti julkisessa kontekstissa sekä kouluissa, jonka pohjalta tutkielmassa arvioidaan 
Suomen koulujen käytäntöä. Metodologinen lähestymistapa on pääosin oikeusdogmaattinen, jonka rinnalla hyödynnetään kriittisen 
lainopin lähestymistapaa. Lisäksi tutkielmassa pyritään kartoittamaan mahdollisesti tarvittavia muutoksia nykyiseen lainsäädäntöön 
tai soveltamiseen (de lege ferenda). Päälähteinä käytetään kansainvälisten ihmisoikeuselinten ratkaisukäytäntöä, kotimaisten 
ylimpien laillisuusvalvojien ratkaisuja, sekä oikeuskirjallisuutta.  
 
Tutkielma koostuu neljästä kokonaisuudesta, joita seuraavat tutkielman tulokset ja päätelmät. Ensimmäinen osio rajaa aiheen 
käsittelyn ja avaa tutkimusaiheen kontekstia. Tätä seuraa tiivis katsaus keskeisiin valtiosääntöoikeudellisiin perusteisiin, jotka 
luovat pohjan myöhemmälle tarkastelulle. Kolmas pääluku tarkastelee uskonnonvapautta perus- ja ihmisoikeutena ja pyrkii tuo-
maan esiin tämän oikeuden sisällön ja vaikutukset erityisesti oikeuskäytännön avulla. Neljäs pääluku käsittelee suomalaisten 
koulujen käytäntöä uskonnonvapauden toteutuksen osalta ja tarkastelee tätä erityisesti edellisen luvun kansainvälisen oikeuden 
asettamien vaatimusten sekä kotimaisten laillisuusvalvojien lausuntojen kautta.  
 
Uskonnonvapaus on keskeinen perus- ja ihmisoikeus ja yksi perustavista oikeuksista demokraattisessa yhteiskunnassa. Tämä 
oikeus asettaa valtiolle sekä positiivisia että negatiivisia toimintavelvoitteita. Uskonnonvapauden sisältö ja vaikutukset määrittyvät 
vahvasti kansainvälisten ihmisoikeusorgaanien oikeuskäytännössä. Nämä tulkinnat heijastuvat kotimaiseen käytäntöön ja määrit-
tävät uskonnonvapauden sisältöä. Näin ollen tutkielmassa selvitetään uskonnonvapauden ulottuvuuksia sekä Euroopan ihmisoike-
ustuomioistuimen (EIT) sekä YK:n ihmisoikeuskomitean (KP-komitea) käytännössä ja kiinnitetään huomiota näiden ratkaisukäy-
tännön eroavaisuuksiin. Tutkielmassa pohditaan valtion harkintamarginaalin luonnetta EIT:n käytännössä ja kiinnitetään huomiota 
harkintamarginaalin ongelmalliseen rooliin erityisesti uskonnonvapauden soveltamisessa. 
 
Suomi on virallisesti sekulaari valtio mutta evankelis-luterilaisella kirkolla on valtion toiminnan piirissä erikoisasema. Ev.lut. kirkolla 
on edelleen merkittävä rooli yhteiskunnassa, erityisesti kouluissa. Suurin osa kirkon ja ev.lut. uskonnon roolista kouluissa perustuu 
perinteeseen ja sitä perustellaan kulttuurisilla perusteilla. Julkisuudessa on käyty huomattavaa keskustelua uskonnollisesta sisäl-
löstä koulujen toiminnassa, mutta suurin osa keskustelusta on keskittynyt suvivirteen ja koulujen kevätjuhlaan. Pääasia ja tämän 
tutkielman aihe on kuitenkin paljon laajempi. Tässä tutkielmassa tarkastellaan uskonnollista sisältöä peruskouluissa kattaen us-
konnonopetuksen, aamunavaukset sekä muita uskonnollisia käytäntöjä, joita koulujen toiminnassa ilmenee, sekä arvioidaan näi-
den toimintojen yhteensopivuutta kansainvälisten ihmisoikeusvelvoitteiden ja näin ollen perustuslain kanssa. Suomessa uskon-
nonopetus on järjestetty niin, että eri uskontokuntiin kuuluvat ja uskonnottomat saavat opetusta lähtökohtaisesti eri oppiaineissa ja 
eri ryhmissä. Uskontokuntaan kuuluville oman uskonnon opetus on pakollista. Vaikka lain nojalla tämä opetus on tunnustukseton-
ta, käytännössä näin ei useinkaan ole. Näin ollen opetuksen pakollisuus on negatiivisen uskonnonvapauden kannalta ongelmallis-
ta. Suomen koulujen moninainen uskonnollinen sisältö ja tästä johtuvat, lisääntyneet poikkeusjärjestelyt ovat johtaneet tilantee-
seen, jossa kaikkien oppilaiden uskonnonvapauden suojaaminen kouluissa käy käytännön syistä mahdottomaksi. 
 
Tutkielman tulos viittaa suomalaisen käytännön puutteellisuuteen ihmisoikeusvelvoitteiden osalta, erityisesti KP-komitean linjaus-
ten osalta. Kristitty uskonto läpäisee suomalaiset koulut tavalla, joka ei vastaa valtion neutraliteettivaatimusta. Vaikuttaa tulosten 
perusteella siltä, että kotimaiset viranomaiset ja päättäjät ovat taipuvaisia luottamaan EIT:n laajaan harkintamarginaaliin uskon-
nonvapautta kouluissa koskevissa asioissa. KP-komitean päätöksille annetaan liian vähän painoarvoa, eikä sitä, että KP-
sopimuksen soveltamista ei koske harkintamarginaali, juuri huomioida. Tähän tuntuu vaikuttavan se, ettei Suomea koskevia, juuri 
tätä asiaa koskevia valituksia, eikä spesifisti Suomen olosuhteita koskevia tapauksia ole viime aikoina ratkaistu. Perustuslakivalio-
kunta on taipuvainen suojaamaan nykytilaa ja perinteitä ja on haluton huomioimaan muutostarpeita huolimatta apulaisoikeuskans-
lerin viimeisimmistä suosituksista. Nykytilan säilyttämistä perustellaan perinteellä ja kulttuurilla kiinnittämättä juuri huomiota siihen, 
etteivät nämä ole perustuslain sallimia rajoitusperusteita. Erityishuomioita tulisi kohdentaa näihin ongelmakohtiin erityisesti siksi, 
että kyse on haavoittuvaisessa asemassa, pakollisen peruskoulun piirissä olevien lasten ihmisoikeuksien toteutumisesta. 
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The aim of this master’s thesis is to find how and if Finnish practice in schools regarding religious content is reconcilable with the 
current requirements of international human rights law and constitutional fundamental rights. This thesis offers a concise view on 
freedom of religion particularly in the public sphere and in the context of schools as a basis for the further evaluation of possible 
problems within Finnish practice. The main methodological approach is legal dogmatics with elements of critical legal study. Addi-
tionally, an element of de lege ferenda is applied. The main sources for this study include resolutions passed by the supreme 
guardians of Finnish law, jurisprudence of international human rights tribunals, jurisprudential literature and other academic works. 
 
The study is composed of four main segments followed by the findings and discussion. The first section of the thesis presents the 
framework and context for the study. This is followed by a summary of relevant and fundamental constitutional factors and interna-
tional human rights instruments that are necessary for the further examination of freedom of religion in particular. The third chapter 
discusses the content and implications of freedom of religion as a fundamental and human right especially through jurisprudence. 
The fourth chapter maps out Finnish practice in school and applies the findings of chapter three to these and evaluates stances 
adopted by domestic authorities. 
 
Freedom of religion is an integral fundamental and human right and is one of the bases of a democratic society. This right imposes 
both positive and negative obligations on the state. The implications of this right are subject to the interpretations made by interna-
tional human rights tribunals, which in turn shape the practical requirements at the state level. Therefore this thesis clarifies the 
contents of freedom of religion as a human right through the jurisprudence of both the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
and the United Nations Human Rights Committee (CCPR) and highlights differences in the stances adopted by these two human 
rights instruments. This study considers the nature of the margin of appreciation doctrine especially in ECtHR jurisprudence con-
cerning freedom of religion and frames the problematic implications of the broad use of the margin in these cases. 
 
Finland is officially a secular country but awards special status to the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland. The church main-
tains a significant position within Finnish society, including schools. Most of this practice is founded on tradition and justified 
through cultural significance. There has been considerable public debate on the issue of religious content in schools, but this de-
bate has mostly centred on one hymn sung at spring term festivities. The actual issue and subject of this thesis are much broader. 
This thesis examines religious content in Finnish basic education covering religious education, morning assembly, the Hymn-Quiz 
and other religious activities that schools partake in and evaluates this practice in the light of human rights jurisprudence and the 
constitution. Finnish religious education is carried out in a sectarian and segregated manner. Education in the pupils’ own religion 
is obligatory for pupils with officialized religious affiliation. Although this religious education is non-confessional according to law 
this is often not the case in practice. Therefore the compulsory nature is a problem for the actualization of freedom of religion. The 
large variety of religious content in Finnish schools and the consequent opt-out schemes have lead to a situation that makes pro-
tecting freedom of religion of all pupils equally unfeasible for practical reasons 
 
The results of this study suggest that current Finnish practice is not in line with all the requirements of international human rights 
law, especially those set by the ICCPR. Christian religion permeates Finnish schools in a manner that does not comply with the 
requirements for state neutrality. It would appear that domestic authorities are inclined to rely on the broad margin of appreciation 
evident in the ECtHR’s judgments regarding freedom of religion in school. Too little weight is placed on the resolutions of the 
CCPR apparently because there have been no recent cases brought by Finnish nationals or cases pertaining to the exact issues 
that are subjects of complaint in Finland. The Constitutional Law Committee is inclined to protect tradition and reluctant to address 
necessary changes despite of recent suggestions made by the Deputy Chancellor of Justice. Tradition is not on its own a justifica-
tion for infringement on freedom of religion. Special attention should be paid to these issues especially because of the vulnerable 
position of children in compulsory schooling. 
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1. Preface 
1.1. Freedom of religion 
Religion and its role in society is a constant point of conversation globally. This is no 
surprise, as religion has been a point of strife between civilizations throughout history. 
Religion is central to debates from large-scale international conflicts to mundane, everyday 
issues. With increasing globalization, cultural and religious pluralism combined with a trend 
of secularization in previously religious nations, this debate shows no signs of ebbing.  
Increasing pluralism in modern society combined with the work of human rights scholars has 
brought forth the steady establishment of freedom of religion as a central human right. This 
right is considered crucial for the protection of personal identity, preservation of culture and 
an important component in the right to freedom of thought and freedom of speech. This 
freedom protects the faith and conscience of all, regardless of one’s religion or lack thereof.2  
The implications of freedom of religion deserve more scrutiny. Everyone has their own biases 
and preconceptions on the role and significance of religion. A truly objective view on religion 
is impossible. This does by no means signify that its study should cease. Scholarship on 
religious freedom must aim for objectivity while recognizing existing biases.  
After the enshrinement of this right in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, several 
questions have arisen as to its application in practice. International tribunals have elaborated 
upon the role and contents of this right and we now have a fairly broad framework to work 
with. 
In the legal sense, Finland is a secular state and does not profess religion3. Nevertheless, the 
relationship between the state and the Lutheran church, which is given special status within 
the constitution, is very close; so close that Finland has a state church system in practice.4 An 
overwhelming majority of the population claim religious affiliation, predominantly with the 
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland. The church is present in everyday life, and the 
                                                
2 Heikkonen 2012, pp. 554–555. 
3 Sorsa 2015, p. 7; This change was made with the passing of the Constitutional Act of 1919. 
4 Sorsa 2015, pp. 7–13; Heikkonen 2012, pp. 555–557. 
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public school system is not an exception: it is built on tradition and this tradition is steeped in 
religion.  
The role of Christian religious tradition and religious education in comprehensive schools is 
problematic when it comes to realizing freedom of religion of the pupils. The subject of the 
role of religion in schools has been under much public debate in Finland, and for good reason. 
It has become an examination of culture as much as religion and education, and is ongoing 
both in media and amongst citizens as well as in political debate.  
Before the 20th century, freedom of religion has not been the grounds for much debate in 
Finland, largely because of the homogenous structure of religious affiliation amongst the 
population. Until the Constitution Act of 1919 and the Freedom of Religion act of 1922, 
freedom of religion was present in legislation chiefly for the constitutional protection of the 
Lutheran faith and secondarily to limited protection of other Christian religions.5 In the last 
few decades, these topics have become a national and international point of debate, due to 
increasing secularism as well as increased immigration in concert with active human rights 
discussion.6 
In Finnish schools, Christian tradition is present in schools’ annual ceremonies as well as in 
religious education and religious assembly. The Evangelical Lutheran Church holds a strong 
influence, as it is recognized as a state church and has a public status. Children whose parents 
are members of a Lutheran parish are to attend classes on religion. Children whose parents 
subscribe to no religion or are part of a minority religion attend different classes: classes on 
life philosophy or if it can be arranged, education on one’s own religion. Religious affiliation 
can be decided autonomously when the individual reaches the age of 18. It can also be done at 
the age of 15 with the parental guardians’ written consent.7 This is justified in part by the 
right to family and its inclusivity of the parents’ right to choose their offspring’s religious 
upbringing and affiliation. What is to be placed under question is whether this constitutes a 
legitimate reason to segregate children into different religious education in comprehensive 
public schools. Could religious education be left solely in the charge of the churches and 
religious communities? 
                                                
5 Scheinin 1998, p. 26. 
6 Ibid, pp. 28–37. 
7 Religious Freedom Act §3. 
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In March 2014, the Deputy Chancellor of Justice gave a critical resolution on the freedom of 
religion in schools, calling for re-evaluation of religious content in schools.8 This resolution 
differed somewhat from the stance the Constitutional Committee had taken several years 
previously9, but the Deputy Chancellor noted that there had been substantial societal change 
and also new jurisprudence on the topic from international human rights tribunals. This 
resolution led to a public outcry from citizens and politicians, as many took the resolution to 
mean limitations on traditions followed in schools.10 What followed was an unusual scene in 
which the Constitutional Law Committee called a hearing on the subject and heard from the 
supreme guardians of legality and legal scholars. This is not a common practice and legal 
scholars deemed it irregular.11 
These events served as a spark for this study. In it, I shine a critical light on the current 
practice involving religious education and other religious content in Finnish schools. Through 
examining the jurisprudence of international human rights institutions I map out a framework 
from which I proceed to evaluate Finnish practice. This study aims to discover how and if 
Finnish practices in schools regarding religious content are reconcilable with the requirements 
of international human rights law. 
In Finland, the issue of religious tradition is very much entangled with the concept of culture, 
and this study argues this produces possibilities for conflict with children’s human rights in 
schools when it comes to religious freedom. The current situation is lagging behind important 
advances in the application of human rights.  
1.2. Framework and adopted methods 
This thesis examines the current position of freedom of religion in Finnish schools through 
jurisprudence, official publications and the work of legal scholars, and clarifies how the 
current practices of religious education and religious traditions in schools are positioned in 
this legal framework. The source material for this thesis consists largely of jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights and the United Nations Human Rights Committee, and 
resolutions made by domestic supreme guardians of law and constitutional oversight. This 
study also utilizes preparatory documents regarding legislation, and an array of written works 
                                                
8 OKV/230/1/2013. 
9 PeVM 10/2002 
10 Yle 2014. 
11 HS 2014a. 
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by legal scholars. In addition to works by legal scholars the source material includes other 
academic works in addition to news articles published on relevant topics, used here to frame 
the societal context of the work. This study employs both domestic and international 
materials.  
The main research questions of this master’s thesis are:  
a) What is the current legal status regarding freedom of religion in schools, both in the 
national and international framework? 
b) Regarding this issue, is Finland currently complying with the demands set by international 
human rights law and its own constitution? 
Both the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee (CCPR) have substantive jurisprudence on the issue of religious freedom in 
schools and other public spheres. These human rights tribunals have distinct perspectives on 
the application of the right to freedom of religion. The aim of this master’s thesis is to 
examine the current state of law and application of the freedom of religion in schools 
according to international human rights requirements and Finnish constitutional law.  
The primary methodological approach is a traditional jurisprudential method of legal 
dogmatics12. This method serves the purpose of identifying the current legal position towards 
freedom of religion as defined by law and case law: Practice of the ECtHR and the CCPR are 
analysed and systematized with the aid of previous research in this legal field. The definitions 
and implications found utilizing the method of legal dogmatics are applied to Finnish 
constitutional law and current practice. This method offers the means to clarify the legal 
implications of the practice and rules seen in schools every day.  
In addition a method of critical legal study13 is employed. As this study aims to identify the 
problems facing basic education and application of freedom of religion, this requires a critical 
viewpoint on existing jurisprudence and an analysis of required change. Thus this study 
includes an element of de lege ferenda, assessing necessary changes in law and practice.  
In Finnish cases examined in this thesis, the problems with freedom of religion in schools 
have much to do with the distinction between tradition and religion. In Finland, the status of 
                                                
12 Hirvonen 2011, pp. 21–26. 
13 Ibid, p. 50. 
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the state church is strong and so is the church’s role in public comprehensive education. This 
study covers the status of religious freedom specifically in Finnish public comprehensive 
schools. A large portion of this study is dedicated to international jurisprudence as it is of the 
greatest significance when evaluating the compliance of national norms and providing insight 
into the questions regarding freedom of religion in the public sphere. The study approaches 
Finnish practice within a comprehensive constitutional framework. 
1.3. Structure 
This master’s thesis is divided roughly into five main segments. The first chapter includes the 
introduction into the topic at hand, clarifies the aims of the study, introduces the methods 
employed in the study and offers a concise background to the questions dealt with. This 
includes a brief account of the religious and societal context the legal issues of this thesis are 
framed in. 
The second chapter focuses on the main functions of the Finnish constitution regarding 
fundamental rights in general and introduces relevant international systems for human rights 
protection. This segment serves as an introduction into relevant human rights and 
constitutional law. Greater weight is put on the European convention system, as especially 
when it comes to ECtHR jurisprudence, this system is of great significance for the research 
topic of this thesis.14 I will also briefly present the CCPR system in as it is relevant to the 
subject at hand. 
The third chapter focuses on the right to freedom of religion specifically as a fundamental 
right according to Finnish law and a human right in international human rights law. The 
emphasis is on the analysis of relevant case law involving religious freedom in the public 
sphere. This part of the thesis maps out the de facto implications and provisions of freedom of 
religion as a human right and displays the central issues under legal and political debate. The 
broad evaluation of freedom of religion in the public sphere is necessary, as it offers a 
comprehensive view on most issues confronting states regarding freedom of religion in 
modern day society, and the view taken on these issues by human rights bodies. 
The fourth chapter focuses on current national practice involving religious traditions and 
symbols in Finnish schools and evaluates the consistency of this practice with constitutional 
                                                
14 Evans 2001, p. 2. 
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and human rights law. The issues facing Finnish schools are twofold: The organization of 
religious education and issues rising from other religious content in schools. 
These are followed by the conclusions (chapter 5) of this study and discussion on the 
implications for future development.  
1.4. Religion in Finland 
In the European context, extreme forms of religious integration into national legislation15 are 
not seen. Some countries have implemented a system with a state religion given special 
status. Other states, such as France and Turkey are constitutionally given to a strictly secular 
point of view.16 The French constitutional principle of laïcité is given much weight and 
permeates French policy regarding religious symbols in the public space. In the United States 
the formal separation of state and religion is paramount – religious assembly given by church 
personnel would be unfathomable in public schools in the USA, even considering the 
prominent role of Christian faith in US government.17 
International human rights law does not prohibit state church systems. According to the 
Human Rights Committee (CCPR) the adoption of a state religion does not on its own 
constitute a violation of the Covenant. States are however obliged to take particular care that 
the status of the state church does not impair the freedom of religion of other religious groups 
or non-believers in any way or lead to discriminatory practice. The Committee requires states 
to report on the measures states have taken to ensure the rights and freedoms of minority 
groups. Special focus is also placed on any blasphemy laws.18 
The overwhelming majority of the Finnish population are members of the Evangelical 
Lutheran Church of Finland. Despite the clear majority status of the Evangelical Lutheran 
Church, the Church has seen an accelerating decline in membership. From the 1950’s with a 
95 % membership rate there has been an emphasized decrease to the 75,3 % indicated in the 
2013 census. The Greek Orthodox Church has held a steady membership of 1 % of the 
population, and does not seem to be subject to change.19  
                                                
15 See e.g. Sharia law implemented in Iran and Pakistan.  
16 Akbulut & Usal 2008, pp. 433–434, 438–443. 
17 Scheinin 1998, pp. 26–27. 
18 CCPR General Comment 22, para 9. 
19 OSF, population structure, appendix table 2. 
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The portion of the population having no official affiliation with any religious communities 
has dramatically increased. The percentage of the population with no religious membership 
grew from the meagre 2,8 % in the 1950’s to 10,2 % in the year 1990, and in 2013 this 
number was at 22,1 %.20 Considered in concert with the statistics on Evangelical Lutheran 
Church membership above, this is significant, as it shows a decided decline in the popularity 
of the Evangelical Lutheran Church that used to be virtually the only religion in Finland.  
This change will likely continue as more people leave the Lutheran church every year. An 
additional fall in membership is a result of minors leaving the church with their parents and 
potential offspring of ex-members being born outside church membership.21 Finnish society is 
seeing a large-scale secularization of its citizens.  
Even most of the members of the Evangelical Lutheran church do not cite faith as a reason for 
their maintaining membership the church. A study conducted by the church in 2011 saw that 
under half of church members cite spiritual reasons as a motive for membership and less than 
10% felt that spiritual reasons were central to their membership. Spiritual motives have seen 
the starkest decline in the past 7 years and are significantly rare with younger generations. A 
majority of church members obtain or retain membership mainly because of religious 
traditions and rites such as church weddings or baptism ceremonies. Also, according to the 
same study, many people saw the church’s charitable work and values as a central motive for 
church membership. This motive was the only one seeing an increase compared to earlier 
years.22 Among Finnish children that are members of the church and receive education in the 
majority faith feelings of ambiguity regarding religion are common. Many state that they are 
‘officially’ Evangelical Lutheran but ‘don’t really believe in anything’ and believe the same is 
true for their parents.23 
Religious affiliations classified as other have risen from the 0,5 % held in the 50’s to the 2013 
proportion of 1,5 %.24 This number is peculiarly low considering the quantity and variety of 
religious communities has grown greatly during the same time.25 Presumably, this can be 
explained by the number of religious people who do not wish for a reason or another to 
                                                
20 OSF, population structure, appendix table 2. 
21 Haastettu kirkko, pp. 77–80. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Kallioniemi et al 2016, pp. 2–17. 
24 OSF, population structure, appendix table 2. 
25 OSF, population structure, appendix table 3. 
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officially obtain membership of their parish and therefore e.g. a large portion of Muslims can 
be statistically categorized as not being religiously affiliated.26 It is quite possible that e.g. 
immigrants do not find it necessary to officialize parish membership to practice religion. 
Statistically, Finland is a very religious country with a large portion of the population 
affiliated with the majority protestant faith. However, in practice it seems Finland is actually 
quite a secular society with people holding on to church membership for reasons based 
largely on tradition and historical values.  
The state awards the Evangelical Lutheran Church and the Greek Orthodox Church a special 
status in legislation. Though officially, Finland does not have a state church, the arrangement 
grants the Evangelical Lutheran Church and the Greek Orthodox Church special status 
prescribed by law and Evangelical Lutheran customs are observed in state functions (e.g. 
church service at the opening of parliament ceremony). The current system is a de facto state 
church arrangement, even if this is not explicitly affirmed by law.27 
The Evangelical Lutheran Church was the state church of Sweden, and therefore Finland, 
when Finland was under Swedish rule. The Finnish state church remained in place through 
the period of Russian Empire rule. The traditions of the state church are deeply ingrained. 
Religious homogeneity was regarded as essential for the integration of state policy.28 It stands 
to reason that a people with like faith and values are easier to govern that a similarly diverse 
one.  
The legal separation of church and state came about with the Constitutional Act of 1919 and 
the passing of the previous Act of Religious Freedom in 1923. It granted religious freedom 
for the first time; founding religious communities and being a member of such became a 
fundamental right. In this legislation, the state declared itself neutral in regards to religion and 
since then the state has not officially affirmed the Lutheran faith.29  
Despite the official separation, the Evangelical Lutheran Church remains a public 
organization and its status and functions are affirmed by law. The same provisions apply as 
well to the Greek Orthodox church of Finland. A separate law is in force governing their 
                                                
26 Kääriäinen 2011, p. 156; Koikkalainen 2010, pp. 47–48. 
27 Sorsa 2015, pp. 7–13. 
28 Kääriäinen 2011, pp. 155–157. A concise but thorough view on the history of the Finnish state 
church and dismantling of same. A theological perspective. 
29 The Act of Religious Freedom 1922/267. 
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functions. Also, the church retains significant power with the state, as all changes to the 
Church Act must be determined by the church assembly, the Synod. 
The Evangelical Lutheran Church also maintains the main holidays in Finland. The Church 
Act states which particular dates based on the Christian faith must be held holy and therefore 
as holidays in the Finnish calendar. This manifests itself economically and culturally, as 
holidays affect opening hours of institutions and services both governmental and private. 
These holidays are shared with the Greek Orthodox calendar so both churches maintain the 
same status.  
In addition, both churches have the right to levy taxes. These tax rates vary on the parish one 
belongs to, i.e. the location of domicile. Only church members pay church taxes together with 
their state and municipal taxes. One can opt out of additional taxes levied by the church, 
simply by quitting the membership of said church. In addition, the state diverts a certain 
amount of corporate tax income to the church as state subsidies. Corporate taxation cannot be 
opted out of. Church taxation has been justified on the grounds that some state functions have 
been delegated to these churches. They are for example largely in charge of burials of both 
church members and non-members and can legally marry the members of its parishes.30   
Religious communities can also be granted subsidies to fund their activities. These subsidies 
are available for all registered religious communities. Other religious communities fund their 
activities with donations, membership fees etc. but are not granted special rights regarding 
taxation or holidays as the two main churches.  
The Finnish system is not a system of state church per se, but neither is it a model of church 
and state separation.31 This model adopted by Finland is not in itself against the right to 
religious freedom.32 
1.5. Central concepts 
 On the concept of religion and belief 1.5.1.
This study discusses freedom religion and belief as a fundamental and human right. Therefore 
it is pertinent to frame the concepts of religion and belief within the same scope as relevant 
                                                
30 Kääriäinen 2011, pp. 156–169. 
31 Gozdecka 2009, pp. 130–131. 
32 CCPR General Comment 22, para 9. 
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human rights systems do. Religion and belief are difficult concepts that are prone to 
subjective interpretation and have never been categorically defined in any human rights 
treaty.33 Therefore the scope of belief and religion employed in this study derives from the 
loose definitions utilized by the ECtHR and the ICCPR in their practice. 
The CCPR frames religion in its comments on the application of freedom of religion as 
follows: 
‘Article 18 protects theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the 
right not to profess any religion or belief. The terms “belief” and “religion” 
are to be broadly construed. Article 18 is not limited in its application to 
traditional religions or to religions and beliefs with institutional 
characteristics or practices analogous to those of traditional religions. The 
Committee therefore views with concern any tendency to discriminate 
against any religion or belief for any reason, including the fact that they are 
newly established, or represent religious minorities that may be the subject 
of hostility on the part of a predominant religious community.’34 
This broad definition adopted by the ICCPR seemingly imposes no limitations, but indeed, 
the ICCPR has stated that a group that proclaimed a faith centred around the worship and use 
of a narcotic cannot receive protection under article 18.35 This seems to be a stance adopted to 
avoid including sham religions from receiving protection under art. 18, but does beg the 
question of where the boundaries truly lie. The practical boundaries of the concepts of 
religion and belief are still being defined. 
Under article 9 (freedom of thought and religion) of the ECHR, the term ‘religion’ can 
constitute various convictions not limited to religious belief. It has been necessary to define 
the line between belief as protected by article 9 and ideas or opinions that do not constitute 
belief.36 The scope of religions and beliefs that fall within the application of this article are 
numerous and it also covers non-believers.37 There is no existing list of which religions are 
                                                
33 Evans 2001, p. 51. 
34 CCPR General Comment No. 22, para 2. 
35 M.A.B and others v. Canada 1993, para 4.2. 
36 Ovey & White 2006, pp. 302–303. 
37 Buscarini v. San Marino 1999; Kokkinakis v. Greece 1993. 
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covered by article 9, but suffice to say the scope is broad and more subject to additions than 
reductions. 
This study does not intend to define religion or belief or find new perspectives on adopted 
boundaries. For the purposes of this study the definitions adopted by the ICCPR and the 
ECtHR are pertinent. These definitions are considered sufficiently broad and flexible.38 
 Basic education and public school 1.5.2.
This study is centred on the evaluation of basic and compulsory schooling as defined by the 
Finnish Basic Education Act. The extent of the compulsory basic education syllabus 
comprises years one through nine.39 The issues dealt with in this thesis extend to school 
systems in general, as they are not restricted to certain grades of schooling but rather permeate 
the entire public school system from pre-school40 and kindergarten to primary education and 
upper secondary schools, and to some extent higher education. Nevertheless, the main focus 
of this thesis is on the years of schooling that are compulsory in the Finnish context. This is 
referred to as basic education.41 
In Finland, all schools are considered public in the legal sense – schools are considered on par 
with public authorities as they carry out duties assigned by public law. The overwhelming 
majority of Finnish schools are publicly funded and even when schools are not entirely 
funded by the state or municipal governments, they are carrying out a function provisioned by 
law. Therefore in the Finnish legal sphere, schools are considered public functionaries and are 
subject to legislation as such.42 The term ‘public school’ is employed in this study to refer to 
schools funded by the state or municipalities.  
The state must provide basic education for its population. This obligation is enshrined in the 
Finnish Constitution. According to the Basic Education Act, the responsibility to organize 
basic education lies with local government in municipalities. Also, the state government and 
other (private) organizations may organize education in accordance with chapter 3 of the 
Basic Education Act. Even when education is organized by a private organization, the 
                                                
38 Evans 2001, pp. 51–66. A concise view into the definition of religion and belief in international 
human rights law. 
39 Basic Education Act 628/1998. 
40 EOAM 4412/4/13. 
41 Basic Education Act 628/1998. 
42 Section 16 of the Constitution. The right to basic education poses positive obligations on the state. 
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organization must comply with the provisions of the Basic Education Act. In Finland, no 
concept of autonomous private schools exists. Some exceptions to the provisions of the law 
can be made in accordance with public authorities and within the restrictions of legislation. 
There is, however, no mechanism for schools to deviate from the demands of human rights or 
fundamental rights as defined in the Constitution. The same provisions for limitations that 
govern deviation from these fundamental rights in general apply to schools as public 
institutions. 
 On elected wording 1.5.3.
Throughout this study the gender-neutral pronoun they is utilized when referring to unknown 
persons in singular as well as plural. This is a conscious choice made to reduce the prevalence 
of the gender binary and to counteract the overuse of the third person masculine.  
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2. Protection of fundamental and human rights 
In this chapter I outline Finland’s Constitution and the main functions of constitutional 
oversight in Finland. I also examine the relationship between fundamental rights and the 
international human rights convention systems most relevant to this study. I will briefly 
present the functions of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Beside the ECHR, UN human 
rights instruments have an important role in the application and interpretation of human 
rights. Finland is obligated to comply both with the Strasbourg court’s rulings as well as 
requirements made by UN covenants it is party to. I will briefly introduce the margin of 
appreciation applied by the ECtHR and central jurisprudence outlining the doctrines by which 
these international human rights systems function. I conclude with comments on the 
international systems’ relevance to case at hand, religious freedom in Finnish schools. This 
chapter concentrates on international human rights organs as protectors of rights in general 
and the jurisprudence regarding freedom of religion is further analysed in chapter 3.  
2.1. Finnish constitution 
The main principles of Finland’s constitution are the inviolability of human dignity, 
protection of the rights and freedoms of the individual, and the promotion of justice in 
society.43 These form a constitutional foundation for all legislation; a strong weight is put on 
the rights and freedoms of individuals. Fundamental rights are specified in the text of the 
constitution and these rights are consistent with international human rights. 
Finland underwent a large-scale constitutional reform in 1995 and the list of fundamental 
rights was harmonized with the demands of international human rights and included in the 
constitution. In some respects, the fundamental rights defined by the Finnish constitution are 
broader and provide more protection than international human rights do.44 Human rights 
provide the minimum requirements for the protection of rights, and therefore human rights 
cannot be utilized as a means to weaken the level of protection granted through fundamental 
rights.45 
                                                
43 Constitution sec. 1, 731/1999. 
44 Hallberg 2011, pp. 29–35. 
45 Lavapuro 2010, pp.170–171. 
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International human rights conventions have placed demands on the positioning of human 
rights in national legislation. One of the central aims of the constitutional reform was to meet 
all demands of human rights law and include a list of fundamental rights in the constitution. 
The goal was not to define vague goals of the constitution but to specify all protected rights to 
some detail and make practical application of the constitution easier. One focus was to 
strengthen the direct application of human rights by defining them in practical terms in the 
text of the nation’s constitution.46 
International human rights are directly applicable in national law and do not necessarily need 
to be included as legislation or as part of a nation’s constitution, as long as national legislation 
is not contra human rights law. When the application of a domestic norm is deemed to be 
inconsistent with international human rights law, this means that the norm or application in 
question is also inconsistent with the Constitution.47 Despite this fact there is a point to be 
made for the written inclusion of human rights law into national legislation. Bringing these 
fundamental rules into domestic legislation strengthens the practical implications of human 
rights law. Human rights are not to be regarded as vague guidelines or utopian wishful 
thinking, but as grounding demands for national legislation and practice. Most European 
nations include fundamental rights in their constitutions – the United Kingdom seems to be 
the only nation with no written list of fundamental rights. 
In general, fundamental and human rights exist to protect the rights of the individual from 
infringements by the state. As many subjects besides the state are endowed with public power 
and can enforce this power in regards to individuals, one must understand references to state 
(e.g. in the text of the EHRC) to mean all such entities that use such power and realize such 
functions that appertain to the public authority. This includes national authorities such as 
municipal government, the Evangelical Church of Finland, schools and universities and 
public corporations. 
The constitution has a primacy in regards to other legislation: In a situation where there are 
conflicting interests, the one with constitutional protection or in the case of the interest falling 
under a protected fundamental right, the fundamental right is always supreme.48 
                                                
46 Hallberg 2011, p. 34-36; PeVM 25/1994 vp. 
47 Lavapuro 2010, pp. 170–171. 
48 Constitution sec. 106, 731/1999. 
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According to the constitution, limitations to fundamental rights must always be prescribed by 
law.49 Fundamental rights are to be provisioned so that deviation to some extent is possible in 
certain situations, as long as this deviation does not negate the central content of the right.50 
The legal limitations to fundamental rights are provisioned in accordance with the limitation 
clauses of international human rights law. Finland is committed to upholding both the ECHR 
and the ICCPR discussed in chapters 2.3 and 2.4. 
 Constitutional oversight 2.1.1.
In Finland, oversight on constitutional issues is placed with the Constitutional Law 
Committee of Parliament (CLC). This committee operates under parliament and consists of 
members of parliament. This is a system of advance oversight; the committee is tasked with 
evaluating the constitutionality of government and other bills and giving a well-founded 
opinion before plenary parliamentary proceedings. The committee utilizes expert reports in its 
work. Despite the Committee functioning under Parliament it has an independent nature and 
is meant to operate outside of political manoeuvring and party politics.51 
Finland, as an exception to widespread global practice, does not have a tribunal system for 
evaluating constitutional issues in the form of a constitutional court. Previously, the founding 
principle of the Constitution entailed that courts do not have the authority to control and 
evaluate constitutional issues. This principle has altered after the constitutional reform of 
1995.52 Currently, domestic courts are tasked by the Constitutional Law Committee with 
constitutional interpretation of law, which allows domestic courts to disregard legislation and 
rules that run counter to the constitution. Courts must take the constitution into count as a part 
of legal reasoning on any given case where this is pertinent.53 However, this has not delegated 
constitutional oversight to courts. Courts do not have the power to propose changes to 
legislation they deem unconstitutional.  
Additionally, Finland has two supreme guardians of law and legality: The Parliamentary 
Ombudsman of Finland and the Chancellor of Justice. The Parliamentary Ombudsman is 
elected by parliament and the Chancellor of Justice is appointed by the republic’s President. 
                                                
49 Viljanen 2014, p. 27. 
50 Hallberg 2011, p. 56.; Viljanen 2014, p. 280–283. 
51 Constitution sec. 74, 731/1999;  
52 Hallberg 2011, p. 57. 
53 PeVM 25/1994 vp. 
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The office of the Parliamentary Ombudsman oversees the public sphere and is tasked with 
ensuring proper observance of the law by public officials and authorities. The oversight of the 
Parliamentary Ombudsman covers all public functions. The aim of the Parliamentary 
Ombudsman is to ensure good administration and the observance of constitutional and human 
rights.54 Citizens may petition the ombudsman when they are in doubt as to the legality of the 
actions or observance of human rights exercised by the authorities or public entities such as 
schools. The Chancellor of Justice, on the other hand, operates in conjunction with 
government, and supervises the legality of governmental action, operation of the ministries 
under government, and also the President of the Republic. The Chancellor of Justice is also 
tasked with overseeing that authorities and public officials, courts of law, and all operatives in 
the public sphere adhere to law, and they also investigate petitions made by citizens. To some 
extent, the duties of these two supreme guardians overlap.55 
2.2. European convention system as a protector of human rights 
The Convention reflects the role of national and European interests. The original text of the 
Convention has been amended by protocols and many additional aspects of European life 
have become determined in terms of human rights since its ratification.56 The Convention is at 
times significantly lacking in its wording and leaves much interpretation to the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). 
The ECtHR has jurisdiction on all manners pertaining to the application of the Convention, 
and judgements made by the Court are legally binding. All signatory states have accepted the 
binding force of these decisions.57 The Court may only deal with cases when all domestic 
remedies have been exhausted (ECHR art. 35 on admissibility). The Convention system is 
quite effective, as states are compelled to abide by the Court’s judgments and the judgments 
are accompanied by a multi-phased supervision system. States are obligated to make required 
alterations and report on their progress.58 
                                                
54 Parliamentary Ombudsman 2016. 
55 Chancellor of Justice 2016. 
56 Pellonpää et al. 2012, p. 10–12;  
57 ECHR Section II. 
58 Mowbray, 2012 pp. 56–63. 
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The Court has a pronounced role in the interpretation of the Convention, and it is subject to 
change in time.59 This is especially true in regards to religion, as its role is changing in most 
European societies. 
  Limitation clauses 2.2.1.
When it comes to rights defined under articles 8 (Right to respect for private and family life), 
9 (Freedom of thought, conscience and religion) and 10 (Freedom of expression) of the 
ECHR, these articles have provisions on the express limitations on the rights they provide for. 
These clauses constitute limitations of the scope of the Convention rights and make specific 
provisions on the conditions for justifiable limitations.60 
There are two basic principles pertaining to these limitations. Firstly, the limitation must be 
prescribed by the ECHR. This requirement has much weight and allows the Court direct 
oversight over alleged infringement on the rights defined by the articles in question. 
Secondly, and in accordance with article 18 of the Convention, ‘restrictions permitted under 
this Convention to the said rights and freedoms shall not be applied for any purpose other 
than those for which they have been prescribed’.61 
When considering the justifiability of a state imposed limitation of a Convention article, the 
Court operates in three phases: First, the Court must determine whether the limitation is 
prescribed by law.62 Second, the Court must find that the aim of the limitation is legitimate.63 
The most common legitimate aim cited by the Court under art. 9 is the protection of public 
order. The protection of health and morals is also an often-utilized justification in ECtHR case 
law 64 as is the protection of the rights or freedoms of others65. Lastly, the Court must deem 
                                                
59 Ovey & White 2006, pp. 248, 251–252; Rees v. the United Kingdom 1987; Cossey v. the United 
Kingdom 1991; Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom 2002. 
60 Ovey & White 2006, p. 218. 
61 Ibid, pp. 220–223. 
62 ECHR art 8–9; Pellonpää et al 2012, p. 223-225; Ovey & White 2006, p. 223–225; Sunday Times v. 
the United Kingdom 1979. 
63 Ovey & White 2006, pp. 227–229; Handyside v. the United Kingdom 1976. 
64 Ovey & White 2006, p. 228. 
65 Ovey & White 2006, p. 230; Otto-Preminger Institut v. Austria 1994. 
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the limitation necessary in a democratic society.66 This entails that the limitation is based on a 
pressing social need and that the limitation is not disproportionate to its aims.67  
The limitation clauses are drafted so that all three of these requirements should be examined 
individually. After the Court has established the first requirement of legality it can move on to 
assess the other requirements in order. Before these steps the Court must of course establish 
the existence of a violation of a right established by the Convention.68 
In this consideration the Court the must weigh the proportionality of the limitation: If the 
same effect of the legitimate aim can be attained with a smaller degree of infringement on a 
Convention article, the limitation is disproportionate and cannot be allowed. As these 
limitation clauses place much weight on the rights and freedoms of others, these limitations 
usually have to do with weighing the ‘greater good’ against the rights of the individual.69  
The margin of appreciation doctrine and the doctrine of proportionality are essentially 
interlinked. The doctrine of proportionality is often used to measure whether a state has 
surpassed the limits of the imposed margin of appreciation.70  
 The margin of appreciation 2.2.2.
Regarding these same articles of the Convention, the margin of appreciation is a doctrine 
frequently utilized and referred to by the ECtHR in its case law. It is a somewhat problematic 
tool. The margin determines to what extent a state can make its own interpretations regarding 
limitations on articles 8–11. The margin of appreciation doctrine demands closer scrutiny on 
its own, as its implications are great in cases pertaining to freedom of religion and article 9 of 
the Convention. 
The margin of appreciation was created in the European Court of Human Rights judicial 
progress. It is not based on any text in the actual Convention, and the origin of the doctrine 
can be traced by delving into the case law of the ECtHR.71  
                                                
66 ECHR arts. 8–11. 
67 Ovey & White 2006, pp. 232–239; Handyside v. the United Kingdom 1976, (48); Silver & others v. 
United Kingdom 1983. 
68 Viljanen 2003, p. 174. 
69 Ovey & White 2006, pp. 222–223. 
70 Ibid, p. 240. 
71 Legg 2012, pp. 1–5. 
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The goal of the Convention is not to force states into a homogenous system of moral values 
and culture.72 This is the main idea behind the margin of appreciation doctrine. Margin of 
appreciation is applied when the Court considers how far the Convention can be utilized to 
interfere with the sovereignty of a signatory state. The Court can grant a very broad margin of 
appreciation or maintain close to no margin, depending largely on the case at hand, mainly the 
nature or relationship of the human rights in contention. The width of the margin is not 
determined in any official documentation that could be utilized to foresee the margin awarded 
in any given case. The methods of measuring the margin have been under considerable 
academic debate, and no reliable system for measurement has emerged. The ECtHR 
determines the margin of appreciation given to the government in each case individually, 
taking all the facts into consideration. Some speculation is possible, but no actual scale for 
margin exists.73 The doctrine is by nature convoluted and vague in its outcomes.74 
Typically, the margin is applied in cases pertaining to articles 8, 9, 10, 11 and 15 of the 
Convention.75 For example, in issues pertaining to the care of children and issues of religion 
and morals, a wider margin is consistently utilized.76 This is a reflection of the ECtHR’s 
disinclination for forcing a uniform moral and value code on the member states. It allows 
states a certain amount of leeway in the way they implement the Convention, especially when 
it comes to matters that deal with morals and culture. This entails that the Court is reluctant to 
penalize states for restrictions of Convention rights when it comes to matters it has seen more 
as issues of morals and pertaining to nationally determined values.  
Also, when a general European consensus on the question at hand does not yet exist by the 
Court’s standards, the Court has been known to apply a broad margin of appreciation.77 Even 
though the Court seems to give a broad margin of appreciation, and lets states limit freedoms, 
in cases of e.g. distributing pornographic literature, it is reluctant to let states limit the rights 
of an individual’s sexual behaviour, like in the case of Dudgeon.78 State infringement on 
individual rights seems to merit less margin than the states’ limitations to protect their idea of 
a general social good. 
                                                
72 Handyside v. the United Kingdom 1976. 
73 Yourow 1996; Legg 2012, pp. 3859. 
74 Ovey & White 2006, p. 240. 
75 Ibid, pp. 232–240. 
76 Johansen v. Norway 1996. 
77 Pellonpää et al. 2012, p. 231. 
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In all cases, proportionality plays a significant role in the limitation of rights and the margin 
of appreciation. The posed limitation to a right defined in the Convention must also be 
proportional as regards to the benefits gained by the limitation of rights.79  
Landmark cases in the formation of the Court’s use of the margin of appreciation include 
Handyside, Sunday Times, and Dudgeon.80 In Handyside the Court notably argued that the 
national authorities were in the best place to evaluate national morals, since ‘it is not possible 
to find in the national law of the various Contracting States a uniform European conception of 
morals’.81 The use of the margin of appreciation does not however entail that decision making 
power is deferred from the ECtHR to the states in all issues regarding morals.82 For example, 
the majority opinion of state citizens cannot define the scope of a human right, even when 
such legal issues dealing with morals and culture would usually be awarded broad margin of 
appreciation. 
The margin of appreciation in ECtHR practice is regularly seen as problematic and has been 
under considerable debate.83 Likely the most substantial critique has been focused on the 
margin of appreciation diluting the principle of the universality of human rights. Critics have 
voiced their concern over relativism in the application human rights, and seen that the margin 
offers a dangerously relativist approach to human rights that is in conflict with universality. 84  
On the other hand, the margin of appreciation has been seen as a useful tool especially in the 
diplomatic framework an international treaty like the ECHR requires. States are more likely to 
agree to an international tribunal interfering in state sovereignty if a certain margin exists. 
This Convention would never have come into being, if the realization of rights had not been 
left on state level.85 Also, the ECtHR has expressly stated that it does not aim to create a 
Europe with homogenous morals.86 Arguably, the use of this margin has succeeded in 
maintaining a pluralistic Europe.87 However, in the case at hand, the margin of appreciation 
                                                
79 Ovey & White 2006, p. 232; X,Y & Z v. the United Kingdom 1997; Goodwin v. the United 
Kingdom 1996. 
80 Dembour 2006, pp. 35–39; Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom 1991. 
81 Handyside v. the United Kingdom 1976. 
82 Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom 1981. 
83 Legg 2012, an extensive account on critique and defence of the margin. 
84 Ibid, pp. 40–42. 
85 Dembour 2006, p. 36; Yourow 1996. 
86 Handyside v. the United Kingdom 1976. 
87 Ovey & White 2006, pp. 2–40. 
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has created an unwanted incentive for the state to disregard some human rights issues if they 
might foreseeably fit within the margin, as I will argue. 
2.3. The United Nations human rights committee as a protector of human 
rights 
The United Nations offers a universal system for human rights protection with global 
applicability. The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) has 
served as a catalyst and model for human rights convention systems: The ECHR is largely 
modelled after the declaration and the text of the ECHR is more than similar to the ICCPR. 
Most UN covenants include individual petition procedures, which offer a similar kind of 
protection as the ECHR system does. The individual petition procedure is native to the 
ICCPR in addition to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD) and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT).88 This study will concentrate further on the 
individual petition as it is utilized within the scope of the ICCPR.  
The UDHR and under it the ICESCR and the ICCPR form a human rights system sometimes 
referred to as the ‘International Bill of Rights’89. When the UDHR was prepared, the aim was 
to eventually forge the legally non-binding declaration into a binding convention system. This 
has not come to pass as such for chiefly political motivations, and the declaration continues to 
exist as a non-binding resolution. Instead, the UN has been the platform for the drafting of 
several, more specific, binding conventions with systems in place for enforcement.90 These 
two covenants part of the ‘International Bill of Rights’ are legally binding treaties that 
establish the rights defined in the non-binding UDHR. 
The ICCPR imposes obligations on states. According to article 2 of the Covenant: 
1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to 
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the 
rights recognised in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, 
                                                
88 Ojanen & Scheinin 2011, pp. 896–897. 
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such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
2. Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, 
each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary 
steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions 
of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may be 
necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant. 
Under article 2(2) states are under obligation to ensure the rights protected by the Covenant 
are guaranteed by domestic legislation. Some legal scholars have taken the position that in 
place of ordinary legislation these rights should be implemented on the constitutional level91. 
  Limitation clauses 2.3.1.
The Covenant also allows for restrictions to and other legitimate ways to derogate from the 
rights determined by its text similarly to provisions made by the ECHR. Restrictions to rights 
are provided for by the Covenant’s text in several cases. The restriction clauses in article 12 
regarding free movement are a good example of the wording utilized by the ICCPR: 
‘Art. 12(3). The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any 
restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect 
national security, public order (ordre public), public health or morals or the 
rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights 
recognized in the present Covenant.’ (Emphasis by author.) 
The provisions made in article 12 regard restrictions imposed on the right to freedom of 
movement. The committee’s comment92 on the application of these provisions are considered 
as a general principle regarding restriction clauses in the interpretation of the ICCPR.93 
The limitations to rights enshrined by the ICCPR must be provided by law,94 have a legitimate 
aim and be necessary to that end and be consistent with other Covenant rights.95 The 
Committee has elucidated that the ‘the application of restrictions in any individual case must 
                                                
91 Ibid, p. 7. 
92 CCPR General Comment 28. 
93 Hanski & Scheinin 2003, pp. 3–5. 
94 CCPR General Comment 27 para 12-13. 
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be based on clear legal grounds and meet the test of necessity and the requirements of 
proportionality’.96  So for a restriction to be necessary it must also be in proportion to the 
protection it is meant to provide.97 This is effectively a ban on any kind of arbitrary 
application of limitations.98 
The Committee places specific weight on the protection of the fundamental principles of 
equality and non-discrimination. All restrictions that are otherwise justifiable must be 
consistent with these principles. The Committee clarifies that any restrictions otherwise 
permissible would be considered a violation, if the restrictions were based on e.g. gender, race 
or religion.99 
 Individual petition 2.3.2.
The ICCPR includes provisions on a Human Rights Committee (CCPR) tasked with 
monitoring the implementation of the Covenant.100 This committee is comprised of human 
rights experts from signatory states and is not to be confused with the Human Rights Council 
(HRC) also operating within the United Nations.101 
The CCPR fulfils its monitoring task through essentially two mechanisms. The first and 
primary mechanism is the reporting procedure102. States are periodically required to report the 
actions they have taken to give effect to the rights enshrined by the Covenant and the progress 
they have made in the enforcement of these rights after ratifying the Covenant.103 The second 
mechanism is the petition system provided for in the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. 104 
The individual petition system is in relatively active use. The application of the individual 
petition system is not an obligatory part of the Covenant, but has entered into force with the 
                                                
96 CCPR General Comment 27 para 6. 
97 CCPR General Comment 27 para 15; CCPR General Comment 27 para 14: ‘(limitations) must be 
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first Optional Protocol of the ICCPR, which has been accepted by 119 states. Finland signed 
the optional protocol in 1967 and ratified it in 1975.105 In comparison with other petition 
systems such as the ECtHR the Committee receives few petitions: Despite being ratified by 
119 states106, only 80–200 petitions are made every year.107 Relatively few individual 
petitions have originated in Finland after the implementation of the Optional Protocol. Only 
29 cases have been brought to the Committee regarding alleged violations of the ICCPR. 
Thirteen of these have been deemed inadmissible and in five cases, the Committee has found 
a breach of rights under the Covenant.108  
Contrary to the European Convention system, the ICCPR does not require states to legally 
uphold resolutions made by the CCPR.109 The resolutions made by the CCPR in the petition 
procedure are the views adopted by the CCPR, not resolutions or judgements. This is an issue 
in the credibility of the committee and the Covenant itself.110 CCPR resolutions may have 
direct effect in remedying individual cases, but seem to effect substantial legislative change in 
a less efficient manner that it’s European counterpart. In the European context, ECtHR 
jurisprudence has a more binding role. 111 Europeans have seemingly adopted the ECtHR as a 
preferred petition system, as it receives multiple times the communications as the CCPR. This 
is reflected in the primary role given to ECtHR jurisprudence.112 
Despite this statement, the CCPR resolutions are not to be considered recommendations. 
Typically, these resolutions include in depth considerations by the committee on how a state 
should resolve the human rights dispute if an infringement is found according to the ICCPR. 
The evaluation is made by legal experts in the field of human rights law, and should be 
considered by states as authoritative.113 Ultimately, the whole purpose of ratifying the 
optional protocol would be negated by the states’ reluctance to abide by the views of the 
CCPR in any case at hand.114 
                                                
105 Office of the High Commisioner on Human Rights.  
106 119 states have accepted the Optional Protocol in October 2016. 
107 Ojanen & Scheinin 2011, p. 897. 
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109 Ojanen & Scheinin 2011, p. 898 
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111 ECHR art. 46. 
112 Hakapää 2010, pp.186–194. 
113 Ojanen & Scheinin 2011, p. 898–899; Hakapää 2010, pp.186–194. 
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2.4. Concluding comments 
The current Finnish Constitution was reformed with substantial effort and is consistent with 
human rights requirements. The possible problems facing Finnish constitutional oversight lie 
in the nature of the Constitutional Law Committee. There are obvious merits to well-
functioning, advance oversight. This makes it difficult for constitutionally dubious bills to 
advance in the legislative process and constitutional issues are ideally dealt with long before 
bills reach plenary sessions in Parliament. However, the Committee functions as well as it 
does largely out of tradition and convention. If Parliament were to shift strongly to a position 
less inclined to abide by human rights provisions, the Committee could quite possibly give 
less weight to expert opinions and function more under political sway. Given that the 
Committee’s stances carry significant legal weight in the interpretation of the Constitution, 
this kind of shift would be detrimental to the legislative process in terms of constitutionality. 
At the moment, supreme guardians of Finnish law and the CLC are prone to consult the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR and the CCPR amongst other human rights instruments with care. 
The power to consult or not to consult human right law lies with the legislature and 
government. If they decide to disregard constitutional points of view or human rights 
requirements, much could change. 
The ECtHR and the Convention it controls is a system of many merits. In Europe, the 
contents and aims of the UN declaration of human rights have been brought into a legally 
binding system that is effectively supervised by the Strasbourg Court. The system is effective 
in that the Court can impose actual sanctions on signatory states, such as monetary 
compensation and the obligation to report on remedies made. The rulings made by the Court 
are binding not only regarding the state party of the case but also all state parties to the 
Convention. The Court has a defining role in the application of the Convention. 
Nevertheless, the Court lacks resources to operate to its full potential. The waiting lists for 
cases are years long, and the development of European human rights law is slowed down by 
the Court’s hampered efficiency. A truly efficient system for human rights protection should 
operate with much more urgency.  
In the Court’s power lies its greatest weakness. Member states have effectively agreed to sign 
away a portion of their sovereignty to the ECtHR as signatories of the Convention. The broad 
use of the margin of appreciation is utilized in part to appease these signatory states by not 
encroaching on state sovereignty in matters of morals or religion. This practice of giving 
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states leeway on core human rights issues is essentially making certain human rights flexible. 
This runs in counter to the nature of human rights as universal and inalienable. This use of the 
margin of appreciation is questionable from the perspective of citizens, seeing as the Court 
awards different kinds of margins of appreciation pertaining to the protection of the same 
article, depending on the circumstances and its opinion on whether it belongs in a category 
where the state might have more expertise.115 
Also, the great weakness of the human rights system lies in the position of state sovereignty in 
international law and diplomacy. Through treaties, states can give oversight over human 
rights affairs to international tribunals, such as the ECtHR. This tribunal would never function 
without a strong mandate from the states. But what should happen if a state declines to abide 
by the Convention? In 2016, Turkey put the Convention on hold for internal political reasons 
during the aftermath of the failed military coup in July. This was done by unilateral 
declaration. The Convention does not allow for the entire treaty to be put aside for a time 
determined by the state. Human rights are truly not meant to be discarded when a state does 
not feel like abiding by them. Front row politicians in Britain have threatened to leave the 
Convention, in the spirit of Brexit. The Convention system becomes essentially powerless 
when nations decide human rights are no longer a priority.  
In the memoranda given by the Finnish CLC and resolutions of the supreme guardians of law, 
the margin of appreciation is given attention, and often, a domestic practice is justified with 
the fact that these kinds of issues usually lie within the margin of appreciation in 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR. Frequently, the requirements of the ICCPR are cited as well, but 
attention is not really given to the fact that the CCPR does not allow for a margin of 
appreciation. The ECtHR is given a more binding role.  
There is a legitimate risk that the Strasbourg court will allow more margin of appreciation in 
the future. In these current times of anxiety on the European continent and changing political 
values, the margin might become wider as states become more wary to protect what they feel 
is their own and in their power to consider. Political statements about human rights have 
become relativist indeed, and the need for a strong authority such as the European Human 
Rights Commission and the ECtHR is needed now. The risk of countries dropping out of the 
Convention in troubled times is obviously great, and I believe this to be one of the reasons 
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that the margin cannot currently be abolished or critically assessed in a fruitful manner. The 
Commission will have to try and hold on to its member states, and a broad margin of 
appreciation might just be a tool here as well. 
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3. Freedom of religion as a fundamental and human right 
In this chapter I outline the definition of the right to freedom of religion within the scope of 
domestic law, and further, within the ECHR and the ICCPR, utilizing the text of the relevant 
legislation and covenant text. I aim to lend insight into the jurisprudence of human rights 
instruments to illustrate the scope of freedom of religion, especially regarding religion in the 
public space and schools specifically. The requirements of the ECHR and the ICCPR are 
paramount when evaluating the compliance of domestic law and authorities. 
3.1. Freedom of religion in Finnish legislation 
The definition of freedom of religion in Finnish law is primarily made in the constitution of 
Finland116, in the Act on the Freedom of Religion117 and the Non-discrimination Act118. 
Additionally other more specific laws give more depth to the prescriptions made by the 
constitution. For the purposes of this study the provisions of religion in schools according to 
the Basic Education Act are especially relevant.119 I aim to clarify the content of religious 
freedom in Finnish law, therefore looking into the memoranda of the Constitutional 
Committee and Government bills and their reasoning is necessary. Fundamental rights 
defined in the text of the Finnish constitution are largely based on international human rights 
binding Finland. The constitutional reform brought about in 1999 closely follows the wording 
of the ECHR when it comes to fundamental rights. 
The constitution defines religious freedom (section 11) as follows:  
‘Everyone has the freedom of religion and conscience.  
Freedom of religion and conscience entails the right to profess and practice 
a religion, the right to express one's convictions and the right to be a 
member of or decline to be a member of a religious community. No one is 
under the obligation, against his or her conscience, to participate in the 
practice of a religion.’ 
                                                
116 Constitution 731/1999. 
117 Act 453/2003. 
118 Act 21/2004. 
119 Act 628/1998. 
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The second paragraph in this section defines the rights to positive and negative freedom of 
religion, respectively. In addition to the constitution securing an individual’s right to practice 
one’s religion, it also safeguards the right to not professing any faith. This perspective is 
affirmed in the government’s bill and its explanatory memorandum for the current 
constitution.120 According to this memorandum, the most significant aspects of freedom of 
religion are the right to profess and practice religion, the right to manifest one’s faith or 
convictions, freedom of religious assembly, and negative freedom of religion. Negative 
freedom of religion here entails the right to refrain from religious assembly. According to the 
government bill, negative freedom of religion is applicable also to religious practice. No one 
can be obligated to practice religion against one’s conviction. This includes the right to refrain 
from religious practice even if one is a member of a religious community. 
Finnish legislation holds other significant provisions in regards to the subject of this study. 
Section 6 of the constitution of Finland states defines the right to equal treatment. According 
to section 6:  
‘Everyone is equal before the law.  
No one shall, without an acceptable reason, be treated differently from other 
persons on the ground of sex, age, origin, language, religion, conviction, 
opinion, health, disability or other reason that concerns his or her person.  
Children shall be treated equally and as individuals and they shall be 
allowed to influence matters pertaining to themselves to a degree 
corresponding to their level of development.’ 
Also, according to section 22 of the constitution, public authorities have the obligation to 
guarantee the observance of basic rights and liberties and human rights. This amounts to a 
positive obligation of the state to secure all rights mapped out by the constitution. This is also 
reflected in the Basic Education Act: it stresses that the point of religious education is chiefly 
to ensure the right to freedom of religion of the pupil.121  
                                                
120 Government bill HE 309/1993 vp, p.55–56. 
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Freedom of Religion is further specified in the Finnish Act on Freedom of Religion. The right 
to receive religious education is an integral part of freedom of religion.122 This has been 
affirmed both by government in its reasoning for the bill for the act of freedom of religion and 
the constitutional law committee.123 Freedom of religion requires that pupils have the option 
to receive religious or secular ethics education according to one’s religion. Schools must also 
take into account and respect individual convictions, children’s rights and the right of the 
parent or guardian to determine their child’s religious upbringing.124  
The practical implications of freedom of religion in schools and the considerations made by 
domestic authorities are considered in chapter 4. 
3.2. Freedom of religion in the ECHR 
 Provisions of the Convention 3.2.1.
Religious freedom in Europe is largely defined by the application of article 9 of the ECHR. 
The Article outlines the freedom of thought, conscience and religion in two parts as follows:  
‘1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; 
this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, 
either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to 
manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and 
observance. 
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’ 
Freedom of religion protects individuals, and is not applicable directly to the protection of 
religious organizations.125 If limitations are posed on the workings of an organization, a 
breach of article 9 usually cannot be found, unless it can be shown that these limitations have 
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in fact breached the rights of individual members of the complaining organization under 
article 9.   
The first part of the article includes the right of thought and conscience. This right is in no 
manner restricted: Everyone has the right to think whatever they do, with no Orwellian 
control or sanctions over thoughts. ‘Religion and belief’ on the other hand are subject to more 
detailed implications such as the right to manifest one’s religion. The right to manifestation 
does not protect all thought; this applies to religions and beliefs and not all thought constitutes 
‘religions and beliefs’. There is no exhaustive list of what ideas and philosophies or organized 
religions are considered the religions and beliefs meant by the Convention. The concept does 
cover a multitude of beliefs and also the lack thereof.126 
The second part of article 9 frames the requirements for a justified limitation of the right 
defined in the first part. Limitations must be prescribed by law and be necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health 
or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. These limitations are 
consistent with the wording of limitations clauses under the ECHR in general. 
The actual text of article 9 offers quite little to go on when it comes to perceiving what the 
function or scope of freedom of religion actually is, and the travaux préparatoires of the 
Convention offer only a limited view into the thinking behind the original drafting of the 
article.127  
Freedom of religion is a human right often loaded with subjective values and perceptions, and 
therefore this right is subject to subjective interpretation. The Strasbourg court has been left 
with most of the responsibility to elaborate on what freedom of religion actually entails in 
practice. Especially when it comes to freedom of religion, there is a pronounced risk of 
perceiving the scope of freedom of religion subjectively, and therefore awarding protection to 
aspects of religious freedom that are familiar and that we are used to, and on the other hand, a 
risk of limiting those aspects that are unfamiliar or different. The nature of religious freedom 
as a controversial and convoluted human right makes its application intrinsically vulnerable to 
bias.128 This should be considered when studying ECtHR jurisprudence.  
                                                
126 Hill & Whistler 2013, pp. 52–55. 
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 Freedom of religion as a ‘foundation of democratic society’ 3.2.2.
Kokkinakis v. Greece was the first significant landmark case on the application of article 9 of 
the ECHR. Greek law awards a special position to the Orthodox Church as the state church 
and according to Greek law, it was illegal for anyone to proselytize another faith. Mr and Mrs 
Kokkinakis, Jehovah’s witnesses, were arrested several times for proselytism and ultimately 
sentenced to imprisonment and substantial fines.  
The Strasbourg court in the case of Kokkinakis defined the focus of religious freedom within 
the scope of the ECHR and this same summarization is used in later cases involving religious 
freedom:  
‘As enshrined in Article 9 (art. 9), freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion is one of the foundations of a "democratic society" within the 
meaning of the Convention. It is, in its religious dimension, one of the most 
vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers and their 
conception of life, but it is also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, 
skeptics and the unconcerned. The pluralism indissociable from a 
democratic society, which has been dearly won over the centuries, depends 
on it.’129 
The Court emphasized that the article composed ‘one of the most vital elements that go to 
make up the identity of believers and their conception of life, but it is also a precious asset for 
atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned’. The Court also went on to state that even 
though freedom of religion according to article 9 is principally a question of individual 
conscience; it implies a freedom to manifest one’s religion in action. Ultimately, the Court 
found that freedom of religion of the applicant Kokkinakis had been infringed upon more than 
article 9 of the Convention could allow. The Court stated that the pluralism that was essential 
to a ‘democratic society’ depended on the freedom to manifest one’s religion. 130 The Court 
places a very high value upon religious pluralism and sees it as inseparable from the concept 
of democratic society. 
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After Kokkinakis, the Court has formed a more detailed framework regarding the application 
of article 9.131 Despite this, the framework formed by ECtHR jurisprudence is considered 
somewhat vague at the moment, with the Court not having a defined stance on several crucial 
issues related to article 9, especially regarding religious symbols in the public sphere.132  
States are not to show bias in dealing with interdenominational disputes. This qualifies as a 
requirement of state neutrality. The ECtHR has not held the existence of systems of de facto 
state church in counter to the neutrality requirement, if freedom of religion is nonetheless 
guaranteed as required by article 9.133 
Article 2 of the First Protocol defines the right to education. It asserts that ‘the State shall 
respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their 
own religious and philosophical conviction’. This article adds additional guidelines to the 
freedom of religion and the application of article 9 when it comes to the education of children. 
This is especially relevant when considering religious education later in this paper. 
According to the ECtHR, freedom of religion is essential in a democratic society. This 
protection is essentially focused on religious freedom and pluralism over neutrality. The 
application of article 9 is not focused on protecting religion itself. The state is required to 
maintain a respect for religious freedom within the limits prescribed by the Convention and 
the Strasbourg court.134  
 Religious education 3.2.3.
Article 9 prohibits indoctrination.135 The consideration of indoctrination is noteworthy when 
the issues pertain to young school children or other easily affected groups. 
States have control over their schools’ own curricula and the means by which they give 
religious education. However, indoctrination of pupils in a specific religion is prohibited; 
religious education must comply with the parents’ wishes regarding the religious or non-
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religious upbringing of their child. Opt-out systems are in common use in Europe as, contrary 
to the US, giving religious education in schools is still the norm.136  
The right to practice or manifest one’s religion or convictions is covered by the positive 
aspect of freedom of religion, and is referred to as active freedom of religion or forum 
externum. Forum internum, on the other hand, refers to so-called internal freedom of religion, 
or passive freedom of religion. In addition to including the right to adopt a faith or conviction 
and the right to keep it, forum internum has many implications regarding negative freedom of 
religion. It for example secures the right of the individual to not divulge their religious 
affiliation in public and the right to change one’s religion freely.137 Evans criticizes the ECHR 
for not giving enough consideration to the actualization of the forum internum aspect in 
practice. The ECtHR and the Commission have been prone to assess this aspect from a 
narrow viewpoint.138 
Most of the central issues when it comes to freedom of religion in schools involve the forum 
internum of pupils, i.e. the right to inner convictions. This is commonly an issue when 
evaluating the realization of negative freedom of religion and estimating when schools or 
states intrude into the forum internum more than is permitted.139 
The ECtHR has intended to find a balance between protecting the parents’ right to determine 
the religious upbringing of their child, state discretion involving the curricula set for 
education, and the rights of the child.  
In the Case of Folgerø, several parents brought a complaint against Norway, after the state 
had implemented a compulsory school subject with religious content.140 The State claimed 
that this subject was neutral in regards to religion, but in practice it contained material 
principally from the viewpoint of the predominant Christian faith. The applicants claimed that 
this education was in conflict with their wishes to educate their children in a secular, 
humanistic manner.  
                                                
136 Powell 2015, pp. 600–601. 
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138 Evans 2001, p. 102. 
139 Ibid, pp. 88–96. 
140 The facts of the case on Folgerø v. Norway are the same as in the case of Leirvåg v. Norway 
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According to the ECtHR, the state must guarantee that the contents of the curriculum are 
conveyed in an objective, critical and pluralistic manner. States are prohibited to pursue the 
indoctrination of children within the education system. Parents’ wishes are paramount in the 
evaluation of this indoctrination. Any indoctrination that might be regarded as going against 
the wishes of the parents regarding religion and other convictions is not allowed.141 Religious 
education can be deemed indoctrinating if it includes religious practice or seemingly promotes 
one religion as superior over others. According to the ECtHR, religious activities encompass 
‘for example, prayers, psalms, the learning of religious texts by heart and the participation in 
plays of a religious nature’.142. 
The ECtHR does not view religious education that has a large weight in the nations main 
religion as inherently problematic. The prominence of one religion in the country can be 
grounds to include more substance on this religion in education. This cannot however amount 
to presenting one religion as superior or preferable to others. State neutrality is essential. The 
case of Folgerø culminated not in quantitative but qualitative favouring of Christianity.143 
Indoctrination of children is generally regarded as markedly objectionable and a tool easily 
utilized by e.g. totalitarian governments.144 The ECtHR has emphasized the need to prohibit 
indoctrination and limit the way governments can influence young children. This is indeed 
necessary as teachers have significant authority over their pupils and therefore schools are in a 
unique position to mould young minds in any given direction.145 Indoctrination does not 
necessarily entail government or school-system wide curricula with indoctrinating content or 
intent but can come about in an individual teacher’s actions in promoting their own views.146 
On the other hand, the ECtHR finds that state neutrality does not entail that parents have the 
right to demand their children be educated without knowledge of religion.147 Also, merely 
receiving education on religion that focuses mainly on Christianity, and at a young age, does 
not, according to the Court, establish indoctrination.148 This view has received criticism based 
largely on the risks that such an interpretation poses. If education on religion is given by 
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teachers with substantially more experience of Christian religion in comparison with other 
religions and a personal background in Christian religion, there is a significant risk that 
‘objective and critical’ education may slide into the territory of indoctrination and 
proselytism.149  
The ECtHR has been deemed ‘unsympathetic’ to atheists or other non-religious citizens in 
some cases. A lacking understanding of the negative aspect of freedom of religion can be 
found in the Commission’s reasoning.150 Evans duly points out that the Commission has been 
unwilling to see past the states’ claims of objectiveness and neutrality and assess the practical 
implications of state practice.151 The implications of social pressure on the fulfilment of 
freedom of religion have gone unrecognized.152 The commission failed to recognize that 
social pressure can eliminate the nominal voluntary nature of religious education in some 
cases. Evans calls for a ‘higher test of indoctrination’.153 
 Religious symbols  3.2.4.
The main issues regarding religious symbols in public spaces culminate in two key debates. 
The first pertains to religious clothing and paraphernalia worn chiefly by immigrant groups 
such as headdress worn primarily by Muslim women or Sikh men. This question concerns 
how and if a state can limit the right to wear religious clothing citing the protection of the 
rights of others. The second issue regards religious symbols used as ‘public language’ by 
public authorities. 154  This issue, in contrast, usually involves Christian symbols such as 
crucifixes or language of the Bible.155 These are typically symbols of the majority religions in 
Europe. 
The most typical discussion on religious symbols is a part of the aforementioned first debate 
and regards what Muslim schoolgirls wear when attending public schools. The most 
prominent example of this is the recent French legislation passed in 2004 based on the Stasi 
Commission’s findings.156 This law prohibits pupils from wearing religious symbols or 
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religious clothing in schools. The ban covers all religions but most of the application has 
focused on Muslim girls. ‘Inconspicuous’ symbols such as small crosses worn around the 
neck are not covered by the ban.157 
The ECtHR has stated that the principle of laïcité (French secularism) is a foundation of the 
French constitution, and therefore represents a substantial public interest. The ECtHR has 
found these bans on religious dress justifiable in several cases involving pupils and French 
bans on religious attire. 
The cases of Dogru v France and Kervanci v France both involve young female pupils in 
French secondary schools who were expelled from their schools after repeatedly attending 
physical education and sports classes wearing hijab head covering and refusing to remove 
their headscarves on teacher’s request. According to the French authorities, headscarves are 
incompatible with physical education classes and the girls could not participate in physical 
activity while wearing headscarves. This was based on health and safety arguments. As the 
pupils were not permitted to attend physical education classes wearing headscarves, and 
therefore did not attend the classes in question, they were ultimately expelled for non-
attendance. The events of both cases transpired before France enacted the 2004 legislation 
banning such attire in schools in general. At this time, there was no legislation in force 
banning religious garb in schools.158 
The ECtHR did not find a violation of the applicants’ right under article 9. The pupils had 
been able to continue their education in correspondence classes and the Court held that this 
satisfied the need to balance the rights of others. The Strasbourg court emphasized secularity 
as an integral part of the French constitution.159 
The Court held that ‘national authorities were obliged to take great care to ensure that, in 
keeping with the principle of respect for pluralism and the freedom of others, the 
manifestation by pupils of their religious beliefs on school premises did not take on the nature 
of an ostentatious act that would constitute a source of pressure and exclusion’ and held that 
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the French authorities in this case had acted accordingly. The Court sees the hijab headscarf 
as an ‘ostentatious’ religious act’.160 
In schools, pupils are in a dependant position brought about by school hierarchy. Schools are 
charged with educating children and caring for them during the school day. Teachers are in a 
unique and powerful position to influence and mould their young pupils. It is therefore fitting 
that the ECtHR has taken indoctrination into consideration with regard to the presence of 
religious symbols in schools. 
In the Dahlab case, the Court considered that a teacher wearing Islamic headdress could have 
a proselytizing effect on the young students. The Court held that Swiss authorities were 
justified in forbidding the wear of Islamic headscarves in public schools. The Court also 
speculated that a teacher wearing the headscarf could have a negative effect on students’ 
views on gender equality. The simple act of wearing the headscarf was considered enough to 
constitute an issue for the neutrality of state schools, even though the teacher had not spoken 
to her pupils about religion or subjects relating to religion.161 This decision has received 
criticism162 as the Court, for all its concern for the pupils’ views on gender equality, did not 
take into consideration the possible positive message regarding cultural pluralism and the 
equality of different religious groups that could have been relayed to the children being taught 
by a person in Islamic dress.163 
Neutrality, in the eyes of the ECtHR, is a legitimate argument when limiting the dress of 
women in the classroom.164 Moreover, the Court has not put weight on any social concerns of 
Muslim women being marginalized in the workforce, if and when they are not able to carry 
on their professions. Banning religious dress from the public sphere can undoubtedly have a 
negative effect on the lives of women committed to their religions. Bans on such wear can 
also be regarded as substantial impairment of gender equality in their own right.  
The Leyla Şahin case also involves Islamic headscarves and the prohibition of said headwear 
in Turkish universities. The applicant, a student at Istanbul university, was prohibited to 
attend lectures and exams and subjected to disciplinary measures because she continued to 
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wear a hijab headscarf regardless of a circular issued by the university prohibiting such 
practice. The university had prohibited the use of a hijab and beards on men referring to the 
secular nature of the Turkish constitution. The Court could not find a violation of the 
Convention and placed a large weight on pluralism and the respect for the rights of others. It 
found that in a society with multiple religions, restrictions on the manifestation of religion are 
justified. The prohibition of headscarves was justified as imposed by the state within the 
margin of appreciation. The Court continued to refer to the importance of furthering equality 
of men and women, and stated that the wearing of Islamic headscarves runs in counter to this 
aim.165 
The case went on to the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR, which upheld the previous ruling. The 
Grand Chamber gave much weight to the Turkish constitutional principle of secularism, and 
deemed that while wearing of the headscarf was grounded in the applicants religion, the 
restrictions made by the state university were prescribed by law and were made to protect the 
rights and freedoms of others and to protect public order. Therefore these restrictions were 
justified and proportionate with the aim pursued, according to the Court. One judge dissented 
from the majority opinion on the grounds that she could not find that merely wearing a 
headscarf could be associated with fundamentalism and radical Islam.166 
In the cases of Şahin and Dahlab, the Court has not considered that prohibiting women from 
dressing as they wish could be tantamount to upholding religious rules that regulate women’s 
dress. In fact, the Court has not placed much weight on the applicants’ claim that they wear 
the hijab of their own free will.167 The Court seems to have good intentions but it remains to 
be shown if regulating manners of dress truly has a positive effect on gender equality. In 
principle, the author of this study cannot find much legitimacy in regulating women’s dress, 
regardless of whether these limitations are posed by religious instructions or by the state. The 
most recent endeavours of French government to ban the use of ‘burkinis’ – swimsuits 
specifically marketed to Muslim women – have been met by public backlash. The French 
government has based these bans on the need to prevent radical Islam. As the ‘burkini’ was 
originally devised to aid Muslim women in attending public beaches and swimming pools 
with more ease, it is much more a garment representing emancipation than a tool of 
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fundamentalist suppression, as some French officials would like the public to believe. The 
UN Human Rights Office has met these limitations with well-aimed, harsh criticism.168 The 
Court’s argumentation in the case of Şahin bears much resemblance to the latest French 
substantiation and differs from the stance taken by the UN.169 
In her dissenting opinion on the Şahin case, judge Tulkens states that equality and non-
discrimination are subjective rights that must remain under the control of those individuals 
who are entitled to benefit from said rights. She states that the stance adopted by the Court 
represents an attitude of paternalism that contradicts relevant ECtHR case law that has 
developed the right to personal autonomy (on the basis of article 8). She also posits that if the 
Court truly sees the wearing of a hijab contrary to the principle of gender equality, states 
would have a positive obligation to control headscarves in all places, private and public.170 
This kind of regulation in turn would be difficult to regard as justifiable and proportionate.  
The Strasburg Court has, oddly enough, not considered other implications of gender equality 
in these cases concerning Muslim women: Expelling a woman from university or dismissing 
an accomplished female employee solely based on the manner of her dress and its possible 
religious connotations can hardly be considered as advancing gender equality.171 The Court 
has not considered this in the cases of Dahlab or Şahin. In the cases of Dogru and Kervanci 
the Court again failed to consider the possible unequalizing effect of state practice that forces 
young, female pupils into correspondence school or private, religious school.172 
In comparison, the ECtHR has passed judgements on Christian symbols: In the case of Lautsi 
v. Italy, the applicant’s children attended a public school. In Italy, it is customary to find 
crucifixes present in classrooms, usually on the wall of the classroom. This is grounded in 
Italy’s Catholic culture.173 The applicant claimed a breach of article 9, stating that the symbol 
of the crucifix infringed upon her sons’ negative freedom of religion. In this case, the Court 
rejected the state’s claim that the crucifix was a cultural symbol and not a religious one. 
Initially, the Court found a violation of article 9 and awarded Lautsi with substantial damages. 
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The Court emphasized that the state had a ‘duty to uphold confessional neutrality in public 
education’ and gave special weight to the young age and vulnerability of the schoolchildren in 
question.174 
The case was referred to the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR after a strong reaction from the 
Italian Government. The political response that followed this case is considered 
unprecedented regarding European human rights jurisprudence. The Vatican strongly 
condemned the judgment, and it was joined by dissenting voices from other European 
churches. Ultimately, the Italian Government requested a Grand Chamber hearing on the case 
and several intervening countries were given the right to be represented in the hearing.175 The 
Grand Chamber proceedings are not actual appeals but rather, the case is reassessed in its 
entirety and the judgement of the Grand Chamber becomes final. This time around, the Grand 
Chamber could not find a consensus amongst the member States regarding religious symbols 
in schools. Largely because of this lack of consensus the Court held that states were to be 
awarded a margin of appreciation, and could decide on the issue according to their view. 
Finally, the Grand Chamber found no violation of art. 9.176 The application of a broad margin 
of appreciation apparently erased the violation of the ECHR. 
 Secularism vs. Christian tradition  3.2.1.
The Lautsi case poses interesting questions regarding European culture and Christianity and 
their roles within the application of article 9. In the European context, Christianity in its 
different forms is the predominant faith and European culture is largely steeped in Christian 
faith and tradition. Will this reality, combined with the Court’s current views on the 
application of article 9, lead into a situation where states do not pose limitations on Christian 
traditions where they see these traditions as culturally noteworthy, while limitations on other 
religions, e.g. Islam or atheism are found legitimate? And rather, does this reality reflect a 
built-in bias of the ECtHR?177 The stances taken by the ECtHR are founded in an idea of 
plurality but also in a European consensus. Based on the above case, a bias of this nature 
should be evaluated. It is also noteworthy that the Court initially did find a violation only to 
be later reversed by the Grand Chamber. The Grand Chamber proceeding followed an outcry 
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from the state of Italy, the Vatican, and other intervening states that had a vested interest in 
the outcome.178 This seems to display a vulnerability of the ECtHR. 
It can understandably seem like the ECtHR is biased when it comes to religion. Islamic 
symbols or symbols of other ‘immigrant’ religions are prone to bans but Christian traditions 
are upheld.179 A large part of this problematic culminates in the scope of the cases before the 
Court, either dealing with bans or existing practice: Because of the margin of appreciation 
doctrine, states are given leeway in religious issues. The state can decide, in certain bounds, 
how it deems fit to exercise religious freedom. A ban of Islamic headscarves worn by teachers 
is seen by the Court as legitimate, to protect the neutrality of the classroom.180 The same 
neutrality is seemingly forgotten when states are allowed to keep Christian symbols in 
classrooms.181 
The Lautsi case was deemed important for many groups: if the Grand Chamber had accepted 
Italy’s argument that the crucifix is not a religious symbol, many feared it would establish the 
legal position as preserving Christian symbols while dismissing minority religions’ 
symbols.182 The Grand Chamber ultimately did hold that the crucifix was a religious symbol. 
But only two dissenting judges held that the symbol was of such great religious significance 
that its context in schools should be considered as integral and powerful.183 
This bias is most probably not an entirely conscious one, and it is not likely that the ECtHR is 
actively aiding the prevalence of Christian tradition in comparison to other faiths and 
secularism. The margin of appreciation doctrine combined with member states’ inclination to 
limit manifestations of faiths foreign to the dominant religion and unwillingness to 
acknowledge problematic religious tradition can lead to an untenable legal space.184 The 
nature of the margin of appreciation lends itself to be used as a tool to protect the familiar and 
stifle the unknown.185 
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Member states are as a rule given a broad margin of appreciation on subjects of religious 
symbols. The Court reasons that states are in the best position to evaluate these symbols. This 
has led to unbalanced case law, where constitutional secularism (Turkey, France) allows 
states to ban individuals from wearing clothing ‘motivated by religion’ but also allows states 
to keep religious symbols in place where it chooses, even if this infringes on freedom of 
religion in public spaces. 
3.3. The CCPR approach 
 Provisions of the ICCPR 3.3.1.
The main provisions within the ICCPR regarding freedom of religion are enshrined in article 
18 of the Covenant. It is noteworthy that article 18 is one of the absolute rights under article 
4.2 of ICCPR; rights that cannot be derogated from even in a state of emergency that 
threatens the life of a nation. The ICCPR (art. 18) affirms the following: 
‘1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or 
belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with 
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, 
observance, practice and teaching. 
2. No one shall be subject to coercion, which would impair his freedom to 
have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice. 
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public 
safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
others. 
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for 
the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the 
religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own 
convictions.’ 
The wording is quite similar to article 9 of the ECHR. The first and second paragraphs cover 
the right to have, adopt, and manifest belief or religion. These beliefs and religion cover a 
very broad spectrum of religion and beliefs.  
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The third paragraph specifies the limitation clauses for the restriction of rights under article 
18: These limitations can only be posed on the manifestation of religion, but again, similarly 
to the limitation clause in the ECHR, no restrictions can be posed on the freedom to have and 
adopt beliefs. The right to hold opinions is very staunchly upheld by the Committee.186 
Religion and belief are specifically under prohibited grounds for discrimination under articles 
2 and 26. Also, the human rights treaty system offers special protection to freedom of religion 
when it comes to rights of the child. The UN CRC (art. 14) confirms the responsibility of state 
officials to respect a child’s freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. Also, the state shall 
respect the rights and duties of the parents to provide direction to the child in the exercise of 
his or her right in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child (CRC art. 14 
(2)). 
Article 14 (CRC) further specifies the legitimate limitations a state can make regarding the 
right to a child’s religious freedom: 
‘Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public 
safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
others.’ 
Also, according to the Committee, no one can be compelled to reveal their thoughts or 
adherence to a religion or belief. This is a noteworthy refinement on the concept of freedom 
of religion involving the forum internum. Within the scope of article 18, it is considered a 
violation of the Covenant to compel individuals to reveal one’s convictions or lack thereof. 187 
This is something that the scope of article 9 of the ECHR does not similarly encompass.  
The CCPR also elaborates more on the concept of manifestation (of belief or religion). 188 A 
broad definition of manifestation is protected under article 18 and the Committee offers a 
broad list of acts and expressions regarded as manifestation. 
Religious symbols and religious dress are explicitly protected.189 In addition, the CCPR is 
wary as to limitations posed on women’s dress in general.190 Here the CCPR’s stance differs 
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from the ECtHR’s attitude to limiting women’s dress discussed above. State-posed limitations 
on dress are regarded sceptically and states are required to report to the CCPR on these 
practices and their justifications. 
The CCPR has adopted a greatly different stance regarding religious garb compared to the 
ECtHR. In the case of Singh a Sikh boy was expelled from French public school for 
continuing to wear the Sikh keski. In contrast to the ECtHR jurisprudence highlighted above, 
the CCPR found a violation of art. 18. The Committee could not find that the wearing of a 
keski could have posed a threat to the freedoms of others in the way that French authorities 
claimed. Also, the expulsion from school was deemed disproportionate. The Committee went 
on to elaborate that French laïcité did not ‘inherently require recipients of state services to 
avoid wearing religious symbols but that this regulation was passed in response to 
contemporary incidents’.191 The CCPR is critical to restrictions posed on freedom of religion 
and is apt to doubt the motives of the state parties unlike the ECtHR in similar cases where 
the states have been allowed a broad margin of appreciation to determine for example the 
scope of laïcité.192 
 Religion in schools 3.3.2.
These provisions do not specify how the relationship between state and religious communities 
must be arranged. Any acts of prohibition aimed at limiting religious practice or religious 
education would effectively constitute a violation of freedom of religion. However, refraining 
from limiting religious expression and education does not entail that public schools must be 
tasked with religious education. Regarding religious education, the states have a negative 
obligation. Freedom of religion does not require the state to provide education in religions, 
just that the state refrain from inhibiting education on religious matters.193 
As to religious instruction in schools, the Committee states that article 18 permits lessons in 
general history of religion and ethics ‘if it is given in a neutral and objective way’.194 Further, 
the committee notes that ‘public education that includes instruction in a particular religion or 
belief is inconsistent with article 18.4 unless provision is made for non-discriminatory 
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exemptions or alternatives that would accommodate the wishes of parents and guardians’.195 
Therefore freedom of religion can be realized both in school systems of strictly secular states 
and in states with a state church system when education is arranged in a non-discriminatory 
fashion.196  
This principle is illustrated in the CCPR’s resolution in the case of Waldman v. Canada. The 
case originates in Ontario, where public schools were tuition free for all pupils. Public schools 
were not allowed any religious indoctrination of pupils. Parents were also able to opt to send 
their children to private schools that were allowed religious agenda, instead of the 
nondenominational public schools. Private schools were mainly funded by tuition fees. For 
historical reasons, the state of Ontario also substantially contributed to the funding of Roman 
Catholic Schools, in addition to small subsidies of other private schools. The petition was 
made by a citizen of the Jewish faith, who found the state practice of funding schools of one 
denomination over others discriminatory. His children attended a Jewish school with 
substantial tuition costs. The CCPR agreed with the petitioner and stated that Canadian 
practice was not in accordance with the demands of art. 18 and constituted a violation of the 
rights of religious minorities who could not obtain denominational education in publically 
funded institutions. 197  
Acceptable practice regarding religious education would be to either exclude religious content 
from all publicly funded schools and limit religious education to homes and religious 
communities, or provide public funding equally for all denominational education, regardless 
of faith. In the case of Waldman, the state of Canada based its practice on a constitutional 
obligation. However, the Covenant does not allow for state constitutions to override covenant 
rights. 198 
The case of Hartikainen and others v. Finland brought to the Human Rights Committee has 
had great significance in formulation of the CCPR’s stance on religious education. The CCPR 
held that compulsory religious education as a part of basic education was to be permitted, if 
this education was carried out in a pluralistic way. Also, if parents wished to withdraw their 
child from religious education on the basis of their own convictions or beliefs, the pupil 
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should be offered alternative, neutral and objective education in place of religious education. 
In this case, the alternative education was to be in accordance of the parents’ agnostic 
views.199  The CCPR especially cited Art 18(4) of the ICCPR, which determines the parents’ 
right to determine that moral and religious upbringing is in conformity with their own 
convictions. The arrangement of educating students in separate groups must however be 
carried out so that students are not treated in a way that causes them inconvenience or stigma. 
The fact that some students are members of a minority religion or not religiously affiliated 
must not cause them anything comparable to harm.200  
This amounts to three outlines of permitted models for religious education in state funded 
schools. The weight is placed on the parent’s wishes. The State can organize: 
1) mandatory religious education for all, when this education does not conflict 
with the parental rights; 
2) optional religious education, with an effective opt-out system; 
3) segregated or sectarian201  and mandatory religious education that guarantee 
freedom of religion through compliance with parental wishes.202 
Determining prohibited discrimination is not simple, and therefore schools or school districts 
might inadvertently adhere to systems that have discriminatory implications, especially in 
cases of religious education. Schools may refrain from direct and overt discrimination but this 
is not enough to ensure that actions do not have discriminatory effects. Pupils can feel 
alienated or be targets of bullying for their religious beliefs or attending exception classes 
deviating from the majority religion.203 
As a rule, the evaluation of practice should take in to count whether any religious content 
within the school context is truly ‘neutral and objective’ or whether this practice includes 
‘religious instruction’. Religious instruction is usually considered religious practice, which 
should always be truly voluntary.204 The Leirvåg case displays some of this distinction. The 
largest issues behind the violation of art. 18 had to do with the inadequacies of the opt-out 
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system. Parents had to give detailed reasons as to why they wished to have their children 
excluded from religious content and in some cases were denied these exceptions or despite 
having obtained an exception, their children were still required to recite religious texts in 
school.205  
The UN system approaches children’s rights in a distinct fashion in comparison with the 
ECtHR. The rights of the child taking into count the development and capacity of the child 
weigh in significantly with the rights of the parents regarding religious freedom. Since the 
CRC’s entry into force, the child’s position in this conundrum is considerably stronger and 
the parent’s role of less importance. Reporting practices under the CRC have shown, that the 
UN requires that states grant children some separate rights some years before legal adulthood. 
A specific age at which the state must allow self-determination has not emerged, but since 
this right is to be extended to children, it would be before the state’s age of legal adulthood or 
majority.206 The best interest of the child should be the leading factor when considering the 
practical implications of the freedom of religion.207 
The main points of the CCPR approach to religion in schools are centred on the requirements 
of neutrality and objectivity and the ban of indoctrination in concert with the best interest of 
the child. 
 Opt-out mechanisms 3.3.3.
The CCPR has been more critical than the ECtHR regarding opt-out systems schools employ 
in an attempt to protect freedom of religion of those pupils who do not take part in religious 
education. This shows a markedly different approach to pupils with atheist or agnostic views. 
In comparison to the stance taken by the ECtHR criticised above, the CCPR has found that 
opt-out clauses are not on their own adequate fixes in regards to freedom of religion.208 For 
example, in the Irish school system, religion permeates all basic education as aspects of the 
Catholic faith are present throughout the school day in different subjects. Most religious 
                                                
205 Leirvåg et al. v. Norway 2004, (14). 
206 Temperman 2010, pp. 869–872; Langlaude 2008, pp. 478–492. 
207 Plesner 2005, pp. 585–586. 
208 Temperman 2010, pp. 879–881. 
  
 
49 
content in Irish schools is unscheduled and continuous in a way that makes effective opt-out 
schemes unfeasible.209 
Opt-out schemes can face a few issues regarding freedom of religion. The first central issue 
has to do with the protection of the forum internum. These arrangements for pupils to be able 
to opt-out essentially force pupils to reveal their religious convictions or lack of such to the 
school and other pupils.210 Opt-out schemes should be arranged in a way that does not require 
pupils or their parents to reveal their reasons for opting out of a class or activity. In practice, 
this is indeed difficult. This requirement favours arrangements where the right to opt out is 
not limited to just a certain religious group and could be done freely by anyone, so that this 
right is sufficiently realized.211 In any case, it is practically impossible for opt-out systems to 
exist in a way that truly protects the right to not reveal one’s faith or convictions. 
Temperman has identified three minimum requirements for opt-out systems to be acceptable 
within human rights requirements: 1) religious instruction must be limited to one subject or 
class, not scattered throughout education and the school day, 2) exemptions must be available 
to all, not just limited to a certain (religious) group and 3) parents and children must be aware 
of the opt-out systems and they must be available to them.212 Even meeting all these 
requirements could cause issues regarding freedom of religion as all of these demands are 
subject to interpretation and practical difficulties.213 
3.4. Concluding comments 
Freedom of religion is an important right defined by both Finnish and international human 
rights law. This freedom contains the positive and negative elements that secure the right to 
determine one’s religion, practice religion and also the right to not practice religion or be 
forced to reveal one’s faith or convictions. 
As discussed above, freedom of religion is not straightforward in all its implications. The 
main issues relate to relationships between negative and positive freedom of religion. How 
much can religious practice or display of religious symbols be limited in the name of the 
protection of the rights of others? 
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The jurisprudence regarding these issues reveals an inconsistency with CCPR and ECtHR 
practice. The ECtHR is of the habit of extending a broad margin of appreciation to cases that 
involve religion and this makes it possible for states to determine much of their attitudes 
towards religion. The margin of appreciation doctrine functions to maintain a pluralistic 
Europe in the sense that states are allowed margin of appreciation in issues that relate to 
national notions of morals, culture and religion. This idea is to prevent the Court from forcing 
nations into one mould. This has however led to an untenable legal space where states are 
able to protect what is familiar at the cost of excluding the unknown – Allowing special status 
for Christian symbols and traditions is evidently permissible while displaying symbols of 
minority religion can be controlled. This bias in favour of Christian religion is suspect.  
The CCPR on the other hand extends no margin of appreciation and finds violations where 
the ECtHR cannot. It would seem that the CCPR offers better protection for those of minority 
faith in the European context and those of no religious convictions. How does this reflect 
European countries that are party to both of these human rights instruments? It seems as 
though the tendency is to give ECtHR jurisprudence more weight in these situations, even 
though there is no official hierarchical difference in the state responsibilities regarding these 
two separate covenants. 
In the context of schools the ban on indoctrination is especially relevant, as children are in a 
most vulnerable position in schools with teachers holding much authority and influence.214 As 
Evans clarifies, children are coerced in many ways while attending school. Students may be 
legitimately coerced into e.g. doing their homework or learning mathematics. When it comes 
to religion and religious education, parties offering religious education must be especially 
mindful of these limits to coercion. Religious education in public schools must not consist of 
preparing the children to practice religion. 215 
Education on religion is to be consistent with the wishes of the parents and carried out in 
neutral, objective, critical and pluralistic manner.216 If and when religious education includes 
religious practice is must therefore be truly voluntary in nature, and opt out schemes must be 
available to all to guarantee the parents’ rights to determine the upbringing of the child.217  
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The right to not divulge ones religion is considered a central element of freedom of religion. 
States should function so, that individuals are not unnecessarily put in positions where they 
must reveal their religion or lack of religion. Within schools this causes issues when pupils 
are segregated by religion due to opt-out schemes or segregated education. 
Even if all the conditions outlined by Temperman are met, can opt-out schemes ever be truly 
unproblematic? Opt-out schemes are apt to cause segregation between pupils according to 
religion, cause negative feelings and lead to ostracizing or stigmatizing experiences for pupils.  
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4. Religion in Finnish schools 
In this chapter, I examine religious education and religious content in Finnish schools and the 
curriculum. I assess these practices from a human rights and fundamental rights perspective 
framed in the above chapters and address the contribution the supreme guardians of Finnish 
justice have introduced. Finally I put forward some concluding remarks. Schools are 
providers of a public service and therefore are in charge of securing fundamental rights 
including freedom of religion in their operation. As basic education is compulsory for all 
children in Finland, this responsibility is particularly critical.  
4.1. Religious education  
The actual content of comprehensive education is determined by the National Board of 
Education in the official curriculum that is to be followed by all schools that are under the 
application of comprehensive education prescribed by law.218 A new curriculum was passed 
in 2014 and entered into force in the beginning of the school year 1.8.2016219. The National 
Board of Education is bound by law and thus must also abide by the prescriptions made by 
the Constitutional Law Committee when applying the law.  
School curricula fall within the scope of the margin of appreciation, and as a rule, states are 
given the right to exercise their discretion when it comes to what pupils are taught. Human 
rights however pose certain limitations, such as the indoctrination ban.  
The current practice regarding education in religious subjects in Finland is based on a system 
of sectarian religious instruction.220 This entails instructing pupils in distinct subjects and 
dividing the children into separate groups according to their religious affiliation. Pupils with 
no religious affiliation are given alternative education. According to CCPR jurisprudence, this 
system is not in itself in conflict with article 18, if the alternative education is given in a 
neutral and objective way and respecting the beliefs or convictions of the children’s 
parents.221  
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In Finland, the religious affiliation of children is based on the religious affiliation of their 
parents or guardians, as is the common practice internationally. Guardians decide on the 
child’s religious affiliation together, and if the guardians cannot reach a decision together, the 
child’s mother may make the determination on her own. At the age of 15 a child may choose 
to resign the membership of the religious community they have been affiliated to through 
their parents, but only with written consent from the child’s guardian. If no consent is given, 
the right to religious self-determination can be made at 18, the legal age of adulthood. 
Regardless of this, a child of 12 years or older cannot be joined into a religious community or 
be resigned by their guardians without the child’s written consent.222 
There is a perceivable lack of attention given to the self-determination of the child. Only at 
the age of legal majority, 18, can a child decide to not attend religious education based on 
their official religious affiliation. This is effectively very late, as most children will have 
completed all their compulsory studies on religion at that point. This bypasses their own 
opinions and convictions.223 This is also in conflict with the requirements of the CRC, 
especially articles 12 and 14 the Convention. It seems quite unreasonable in regards to the 
rights of the child that such a meaningful determination can be made by the child’s parents for 
so long.224 Children also should have the right to self-determination in the scope of freedom 
of religion.  
Even members of the majority religion should have the right to determine when and how they 
want to practice religion, if at all. The current practice effectively eliminates children’s right 
to religious freedom within schools when they have an official affiliation to the majority 
religion and does not give weight to the children’s own opinions in accordance with their age 
and maturity. It would appear that pupils receiving education in a minority religion are 
allowed to move much more freely from religious classes to ethics classes without 
membership of religious groups being scrutinized.225 
The principal rule on religious education in Finland is that pupils are taught according to the 
majority religion of pupils. In most schools this will be the Evangelical Lutheran faith, the 
overwhelming majority religion in Finland. Pupils that are members of the Evangelical 
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Lutheran church will therefore receive religious education in that faith. Also, pupils who are 
not members of this majority religion may choose to attend classes on said religion with their 
guardians’ notification.226 
In addition, if there are more than three pupils belonging to the Evangelical Lutheran Church 
or the Orthodox Church, they will be offered education in their own faith if it is not the 
majority religion being taught. Furthermore, the law requires that any pupils, who are 
members of other religious communities than the aforementioned two with special status, may 
receive education in their own religion if the amount of pupils requiring education in said 
different religion exceeds three pupils and their guardians request such education. The three-
pupil-rule covers the amount of pupils in a certain school district.227  
Pupils who have no registered religious affiliation and who do not partake in the majority 
religion’s classes will be taught ethics.228 Pupils, who are not given religious education of 
their own religion, may attend ethics classes with the consent of their guardian. The party in 
charge of education shall organize ethics education when there are at least three pupils 
entitled to it. Also, a pupil who does not belong to any religious community may, at the 
request of their guardian, also participate in religious education provided by schools, which in 
view of their upbringing and cultural background evidently corresponds to their religious 
beliefs.229 
The government endeavoured to pass an amendment to the Basic Education Act to change the 
required limit of three students for the organization of alternative religious education to 10 
pupils.230 This amendment was proposed as a finance act to balance the state budget from the 
beginning of 2015. This would have made it even more difficult to arrange other religious 
education than that of the state churches in many schools. Ultimately the bill was not passed 
after the Constitutional Committee gave its opinion on it.231 The pronouncement was not 
favourable to the government’s aims to limit pluralistic religious education in practice. The 
CLC foresaw risks of discriminatory treatment of pupils based on religion. 
                                                
226 Basic Education Act Section 13; The National Board of Education 3/012/2014. 
227 The National Board of Education 3/012/2014. 
228 The National Board of Education, Curriculum 104/ 011/2014; ET-opetus 2016. This subject is 
usually translated as ”ethics” but the subject deals with other themes in addition to ethics such as 
culture, world religions, philosophy, way of life etc.  
229 Basic Education Act Section 13. 
230 Government bill HE 136/2014 vp. 
231 PeVM 37/2014. 
  
 
55 
Situations in which only one or two students with minority religious affiliations attend basic 
education are common. Also, it is common practice that in smaller cities and towns, pupils 
must commute to another school for ethics class and/or classes on minority religions, if any 
are available.232 If no ethics or other religious education can be provided, because of the small 
amount of children affected, the school must organize other meaningful and worthwhile 
activities for the pupils not participating in the majority religion classes.233 In practice, these 
activities vary greatly from school to school and range from watching films to independent 
study or homework. On the other hand, in the Helsinki metropolitan area there are schools in 
which religious education is given in five or six different religions in addition to ethics class. 
This causes problems of its own: for example educational materials are often lacking in the 
minority religions as resources are stretched thin.234 
The current religious education system has received substantial critique. The quality of 
religious education in minority religions is lacking, and school headmasters find it impossible 
to sufficiently train unprepared teachers in these minority religions. The need to segregate 
pupils into several groups also causes significant trouble regarding scheduling and leads to 
religious education being situated at hours that are less than ideal and conflicting with 
pedagogic aims.235 
 Religious practice within religious education 4.1.1.
Religious education in one’s own faith is not religious practice, according to Finnish law. In 
the reformation of the Freedom of Religion act in 2002, section 13 on basic education on 
religion was amended. Previously this section defined religious education as ‘denominational’ 
and now this section refers to ‘the pupils’ own religion’. The government’s reasoning for this 
amendment is based on the intention that religious education does not include promulgation 
of religion or religious practice in the form of worship. It was also emphasized that religious 
education had not for some time included declarations of a religious nature.236 Furthermore, 
the Board of Education decrees that religious education is not denominational, nor is the 
purpose of religious education to bind children to any religious community or instruct in the 
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practice of any religion, but instead to familiarize pupils with their own religion and acquaint 
them with other religions and world views.237 
The intent behind changing religious education from ‘denominational’ to ‘own religion’ is 
noteworthy. The preparatory documents indicate that the new term was more descriptive of 
the circumstances that had existed for some time: religious education had not officially, per 
the curriculum, included confessions of faith or worship. This change in the legal definition of 
religious education was not meant to have any actual effect on the contents of the 
curriculum.238 Martin Scheinin dissented as a member of the preparatory committee: he 
advocated for religious education remaining denominational, so that pupils could make a real 
choice between education and ethics education.239 
The actual implications of this change are a bit complex. The Committee on freedom of 
religion and other experts held that education was not denominational even before the change 
they saw mainly as terminological. The amendment to legislation was in effect made to 
legally ratify the status quo and clarify the situation for all.240 It has been argued that in fact, 
the non-confessional content was not actually realized in practice before the amendment, in 
the way that the Committee found.241 
The Constitutional Law Committee gave a memorandum regarding the new act on religious 
freedom and its constitutional and human rights implications before parliament passed the bill 
in 2002. This memorandum elaborates on what the committee has seen as functions of 
specific requirements set if the bill is passed.242 The Committee did not find issues regarding 
fundamental rights when considering the amendments regarding religious education. The 
Committee also studied the curriculum for religious education (i.e. one’s own religion) and it 
could not find a conflict with the constitution. It stated that when one is being taught one’s 
own religion, education can include prayer, church visits and participation in church 
ceremony without being considered religious practice as meant by the constitution. The 
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committee sees prayer and religious ceremony in religious education solely as educative in 
the majority religion, and of important informative value for comprehensive education.243  
The Board of Education refers to the determination made by the legislature and stresses that 
as a part of pupils’ own religious education prayer, religious hymns, excursions into religious 
communities, or participations in church functions such as religious sacraments are not 
considered religious practice, but a part of the education given.244 
This interpretation is directly in conflict with jurisprudence of the CCPR. 245 According to the 
CCPR in the case of Leirvåg, learning prayer by heart and or reciting prayers is religious 
practice. Taking part in a religious act or rite constitutes religious practice. The interpretation 
of the CLC is apparently based on an understanding that when pupils are being educated in 
religious rites and ceremony they do not take part in them in a manner that would constitute 
religious practice.246 The lines drawn here by the Finnish legislature are vague. Simply 
declaring that religious content in religious education is not religious practice cannot make it 
so.  
This vagueness gives way to variation in practice and opportunities for schools to stretch the 
boundaries. For example, reciting prayer in a kneeling position is not permitted religious 
content in religious education. Some schools have however included this as a compulsory part 
of religious education and the means for monitoring practice such as this is lacking. The 
National Board of Education claims that it is not feasible to list all forbidden practice because 
of its variety.247 
The current legal position in regards to religious education is elaborated by a resolution made 
by the Deputy Parliamentary Ombudsman in 2014.248 The resolution regards the content of 
textbooks used in religious education in the Evangelical Lutheran faith in basic education 
(years 1 to 6). According to the complaint, these textbooks were denominational and 
indoctrinating in content. The complaint stated that the content of these books effectually 
constituted religious practice and included examples of chapter titles in the book such as ‘the 
Heavenly Father bestows protection’, ‘the angel walks beside me’ and ‘God created man’. 
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The complaint also criticized the curriculum for religious education on the ground that despite 
stating that the goals for religious education was to provide pupils with an academically well 
rounded knowledge of their religion, the specific contents of education under the main theme 
of ‘Protection and Safety’ listed titles such as ‘God as Lord and Creator’, ‘The Lord’s 
blessing and Jesus’ teachings on grace of God’ etc. The main issue according to the complaint 
was that children were being taught, by means of the content of the textbooks, to trust their 
safety in religion. The complainant saw this as harmful indoctrination and requested that in 
the light of this information, religious education should be made voluntary for all pupils, 
regardless of their religion.  
The Ombudsman found that the content of the textbooks in question were indeed 
denominational in a way that legislation did not permit. He could not, however, address the 
issues brought up by the complaint involving the very common experiences regarding the 
inconsistency of school practice and the power lying with individual teachers. It is beyond the 
jurisdiction of the ombudsman to propose new legislation and they can mainly point out 
problems.  
This complaint raised an interesting question on whether religious education can be 
compulsory when the religious content is of the pupils’ own religion. Negative freedom of 
religion includes the right to not manifest one’s beliefs.249 In Finnish interpretation, this 
education can be obligatory for children in their own religion, because the education is not 
nominally denominational and does not include indoctrination. These principles are further 
elaborated and defined in the guidelines for the curriculum maintained by the National Board 
of Education.  
The supreme guardians of Finnish law have claimed that the law offers sufficient guarantees 
of freedom of religion. It is general knowledge in Finland that individual teachers hold much 
power in how they approach religious education, and many integrate more religious content 
than is allowed by law. Individual schools might incorporate much more religious practice in 
their education than others, or employ textbooks that have denominational content. It is 
therefore difficult to determine how religious this education truly is in every case. This also 
makes it difficult to single out responsible parties for administrative sanctions.250 
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Parliament found in 2001 that religious education was already non-confessional in nature and 
so the amendment to ‘own religion’ only affirmed the status quo. In practice much of 
religious education has been denominational before and after the amendment. 251  The 
legislature has been unwilling to see that the actual practice regarding religious education can 
easily deviate from the official curriculum and therefore the law.  
Considering that within Finnish law children cannot independently determine their religion 
until the age of legal adulthood a system for children to be able to opt-out of classes on their 
own religion should be made available.252 This requirement is compounded by the fact that 
the government is unable to efficiently monitor the detailed compliance of the official 
curriculum school-by-school.253  
4.2. Religious content in schools 
As a principal rule, the Constitutional Law Committee states that no one shall be obligated to 
participate in church services or religious ceremony.254 However, it is not entirely clear what 
constitutes religious ceremony in practice. There has been little to no controversy regarding 
religious symbols in Finnish schools but other religious content is a common item of 
debate.255 
The current guidelines made by the Board of Education concerning religious events in schools 
state that the normal course of life in schools can include religious events including but not 
limited to religious morning assembly, service of worship, or religious concerts. For example, 
most schools participate in Christmas church service at their local Lutheran Church. These 
events are regarded as religious practice. As such, no one may be forced to participate in these 
events against one’s religious convictions or lack thereof. At their guardians’ request pupils 
can be exempt from these religious events. Schools are obligated to arrange other activities 
for students who are exempt from religious practice.256  
The schools are to arrange alternative and meaningful activities for these students for the 
duration of the religious event. These alternative activities are to be similar to those in the 
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main event excluding the religious content.257 In practice this is very much up to the schools 
and what they regard meaningful alternatives. The spectrum here is very broad, and these 
practices are not subject to significant oversight. In addition, schools are tasked with making 
sure that pupils not taking part in religious ceremonies are not subject to stigmatization or 
other harmful consequences.258 The Constitutional Law Committee has not elaborated on how 
this is to happen in practice. How can a school assure that a pupil is not ostracized by other 
pupils as a direct result of not attending the same events or that pupils are not subject to 
bullying because of their faith or lack thereof? The CCPR has taken a critical stance in a case 
where a pupil had been bullied because they ‘did not believe in god’ under the Norwegian 
system of compulsory religious education.259  
In practice, schools have varying ways of dealing with these practical issues caused by 
religious content. In some schools, pupils exempt from religious content watch videos, draw 
or simply wait in school hallways with no supervision. This displays the difficulties schools 
face when attempting to secure freedom of religion for all pupils, and these arrangements are 
often unsatisfactory.260  
 Morning assembly 4.2.1.
A significantly religious element in Finnish schools is morning assembly. According to 
Finnish law, every school day is begun with morning assembly.261 These assemblies take 
place in the school gym, classroom, or other assembly hall. A common practice is to give 
these speeches through the schools PA system, as not to disrupt the day, and pupils commonly 
listen while waiting for the first class to begin. These assemblies are commonly spiritual of 
nature and can include a sermon or short talk given by a local priest or other parish 
personnel.262  
According to the guidelines for the curriculum, morning assemblies are part of school 
activities that are meant to support learning, versatile development and well-being. These 
elements of the school day are also meant to enhance the experience of a good and safe school 
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day.263 According to the National Board of Education morning assemblies can be religious in 
nature.264 Current instructions can give pupils with no religious affiliation or affiliation to 
minority religions the option to sit in the hallway when the speech is given while their peers 
are seated in the classroom.265 This does not necessarily prevent the students from hearing the 
speech, as the PA system, for obvious reasons, reaches the hallways as well. In many cases, 
the only way for pupils to actually avoid hearing the religious announcements is to exit the 
school building into the yard.266 In media coverage on this subject a pupil told that his teacher 
would just laugh if he stated unwillingness to listen to the assembly.267 This narrative is not 
surprising. 
When assemblies are held in assembly halls etc., pupils with no affiliation to the majority 
religion will have the option to stay in the hallway or classroom with no real activity options. 
This peculiar arrangement seems more of a symbolic gesture, so that pupils who are not 
members of the majority religion are not obligated to sit and listen to these announcements. 
Pupils are generally not permitted to leave school grounds during the school day, and such an 
arrangement would also be quite peculiar and again, offer more possibility for ostracizing 
experiences. 
The National Board of Education issues bulletins directed at education officials and 
institutions to clarify requirements of law regarding religious education and religious content 
in schools. According to the National Board of Education, schools could continue arranging 
religious events such as Christian morning assembly and church service in schools. The 
bulletin acknowledged that events such as these are considered religious practice by the 
legislature and therefore should be suspect to special care when handling students and their 
parents. This usually entails opt-out procedures including forms signed by guardians and the 
like. The schools maintain information on the religious affiliation of the pupils and the wishes 
of the parents obtained by signed forms.268  
This is hardly consistent with the requirement for prevention of stigmatization or other 
harmful consequences. Also, it is difficult to see how the aims of morning assembly are 
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consistent with the actual practical implications that religious content imposes. When pupils 
are singled out and separated from their companions, religious morning assembly can scarcely 
make for a positive and safe experience and a communal school. On the contrary, morning 
assembly with religious content is apt to foster communality only among pupils and teachers 
of the majority faith at the expense of others. 
As Evans stipulates, arrangements concerning religious education in schools can become 
discriminatory, if pupils are de facto marginalized or the sectarian approach leads to the 
minority groups’ treatment seeming like punishment.269 One could quite easily see that 
placing a specific few pupils out into the hallway or yard for the duration of religious morning 
announcements affectively singles them out and may seem like a punishment for not 
professing the majority faith. This is especially true if the room non-Christian pupils are 
placed in during religious activities is the same room used for punishment such as 
detention.270 This practice also makes the religious affiliation of students very public. The 
pupils have no way of keeping their religion or lack of religion private. It is difficult to see 
what ‘special care’ as meant by the Board of Education could remedy this shortcoming in 
practice. 
The matter of pupils’ religion as private or public is an issue in light of ECtHR practice. 
Negative freedom of religion includes the right to not manifest one’s beliefs.271 In Finnish 
schools, pupils have no way of keeping their religious identity or affiliation private. Schools 
maintain registries of the pupils’ religions for the functions of opt-out systems concerning 
religious events. Grouping pupils for the purposes of segregated religious education would 
not be possible unless the school maintained this information. In the extreme scenario pupils 
are segregated each morning according to religious affiliation and placed in different spaces 
to listen to or to avoid the morning assembly. Even in schools less inclined to religious 
content religious morning assemblies take place each month or so and Christmas church is a 
given. Pupils cannot reasonably maintain their affiliation private from the school authorities, 
teachers or even other pupils. This is hardly a justifiable practice. None of the limitation 
clauses needed to encroach on negative freedom of religion in this way are applicable here. 
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Regardless of the recommendation given by the Deputy Chancellor of Justice, the National 
Board of Education has not amended its guidelines. The guidelines still state that as clarified 
by the Constitutional Committee the singing of one religious hymn does not in itself 
constitute religious practice. Neither has the Board of Education included any mention in its 
guidelines regarding problematic division of students or considerations of individual pupils’ 
convictions. The guidelines do not advise schools on the matter of religious ceremony in 
school, and only instruct schools to offer discreet options for students to refrain from religious 
content during school days. It is obvious that how ever discreet these arrangements may be, 
within these current practices it is impossible for a school to guarantee the privacy of religious 
affiliation and sensitivities.  
The Board of Education’s attitude reflects the majority religion’s status in Finland. There is 
no perceptible will within the legislature to make schools neutral areas in regards to religion, 
quite the opposite. The majority religion’s strong foothold in the school system is based on 
tradition, and attempts to change the status quo have been summarily dismissed.272  
 Hymn-Quiz 4.2.2.
In 2015, the parliamentary ombudsman reprimanded the National Board of Education for 
organizing the Hymn-Quiz at schools in cooperation with an association of the Evangelical 
Lutheran Church273. The Hymn-Quiz is a competition organized every other year and is 
targeted particularly at pupils of the 3rd and 4th years. The contest begins in the fall and 
continues throughout the school year. A part of the competition is organized within schools. 
Although participation in this contest is voluntary, this kind of competition is apt to foster 
alienation with pupils not affiliated to the church and put pressure on participation in the 
name of communality, especially since the quiz is organized so that whole classes are meant 
to participate, put in practice non-Christian students are excluded within opt-out schemes.  
The bulletin distributed by the Board of Education also contained tips for the schools on how 
to integrate hymn knowledge into education in various subjects. For example, the instructions 
included ways to integrate hymns into arts and music class, even physical education and 
Finnish language classes. The excluding nature of these activities is displayed particularly 
well in one of the multiple recommended activities. The activity entails a teacher placing a 
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Hymn book in the centre of the floor following this by statements such as ‘I have sung a 
hymn at a funeral’ or ‘I have sung a hymn at Christmas church’ etc. If a statement applies to a 
pupil they are to take a step closer to the book. This is jarringly exclusive as pupils who have 
no experience of singing hymns or attending church are singled out. The event also offers 
ready-made content for schools to utilize in its morning assemblies, every one involving a 
different hymn and all very much religious in nature.274 
The Board of Education claimed it had not violated its constitutional obligation of neutrality. 
This was based on the voluntary nature of the competition and that participation in the contest 
was not affiliated to the instruction of any particular subject. The church organisation behind 
the quiz-event had distributed its own bulletins on the event that differed from the one 
circulated by the Board of Education. The board of education had modified the bulletin and 
removed some aspects it perceived in conflict with constitutional requirements. There were in 
effect two different bulletins about the event.  
This reprimand brought up problematic elements of the Hymn-Quiz. Hymns are religious 
songs by nature. 275 The quiz should be truly voluntary and the instructions should make it 
possible for pupils and their parents to effectively opt out of the competition in a way that 
does not put undue pressure on pupils to participate.276  
The reprimand, however, did not find that in future the Hymn-Quiz should be organized 
without schools’ involvement. I see this as an issue: Schools cannot effectively ensure that 
pupils are not ostracized or socially pressured when it comes to this kind of content in 
schools. This brings just another extra element of religion into schools. This kind of activity is 
apt to create the image that the state is actively promoting the Evangelical Lutheran faith.  
The association behind this quiz states that its mission is to promote the Christian upbringing 
of children and to strengthen the commitment of children and families to the church.277 Also, 
the aim of the Hymn-Quiz is to promote knowledge of hymns in a fun way.278 In this light, it 
is quite clear that the motivations behind this event are religious. This event is meant to 
promote the Evangelical Lutheran faith.  
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In the school year 2016–2017 the Hymn-Quiz is running normally, in cooperation with the 
Board of Education and schools. Over 3000 pupils are enrolled in the contest, according to the 
organizers. The event includes more than just the contest and it offers schools a variety of 
activities they can adopt into daily use that are clearly in conflict with requirements of 
neutrality. These activities are all deeply involved in church activities and not only hymns. 
The main effect that the reprimand given by the Parliamentary Ombudsman seems to have 
had has been on the manner in which the National School Board communicates on the 
subject. The reprimand mainly addressed the incapacity of a School Board administrative in 
charge of the Hymn-Quiz, who, it turned out, also held an executive position in the 
association organizing the same quiz. 
This is in strong conflict with the neutrality schools should display and is not in accordance 
with the stance adopted by the CCPR. The kind of activity promoted by the Hymn-Quiz can 
easily lead to schools being disproportionately suffused in Evangelical Lutheran content. As 
the Deputy Chancellor of Justice well sums up, the state must be ‘transitional, conciliatory, 
balancing and alleviate conflict’.279 Allowing the Lutheran church to organize content of 
public schooling is in stark contrast with the schools’ obligation to ensure freedom of religion 
and does not safeguard the state’s balancing role. 
 Summer Hymn 4.2.3.
School events such as the traditional end of semester assemblies and Christmas assemblies are 
not considered religious ceremonies. These events can contain elements of religious nature 
without participation in these events being considered religious practice by the state. The 
Constitutional Law Committee has explicitly stated in its memorandum on the government 
bill for the Freedom of Religion act that these traditional school events are a part of Finnish 
culture and therefore if a religious hymn is sung in these events that would not imply the 
event itself has a religious nature.280  
With the last phrase, the Constitutional Law Committee is referring to a specific hymn that 
has traditionally been sung in end of semester celebrations in schools, Suvivirsi, or Summer 
hymn. It is a popular and widely known hymn in Finland. This hymn is usually sung by all 
the pupils and school staff in a celebratory event on the last day of school, when pupils 
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receive their report cards before summer vacation. Attendance is usually mandatory as these 
events are organized during school hours.  
A hymn is by definition a religious song. The Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland states 
that hymns are prayers in the form of song.281 The Summer Hymn has several verses of 
significantly religious nature. The hymn dates back to the great famine of 1695–1697282 and is 
quite literally a song for giving thanks to God, for the coming of spring and abundance. The 
Hymn is included in the Church’s hymnbook. The public debate on whether or not the 
Summer Hymn is a religious song is peculiar seeing as the song has obvious religious 
significance and content. 
The custom of singing the Summer Hymn was evaluated by the deputy parliamentary 
ombudsman in 2013.283 This legal opinion was based on the context in which this hymn is 
sung: The end-of-term celebration is not a religious event. He additionally pointed out that 
usually only the two first verses of the hymn are sung, and these verses mention God only 
once. Ultimately, the hymn is a religious song, but if only the first two verses are sung at 
schools’ end-of-term events, the nature of the hymn is not ‘pronouncedly religious’. 
Therefore the end-of-term fetes remain legally non-religious events, in the light of this 
opinion. This is also the basis in the later resolution given by the deputy chancellor of 
justice.284 If additional verses are sung or indeed, the whole hymn, this legal position changes.  
This is an example of the practical difficulties schools face when enacting freedom of 
religion. It is indeed difficult to know before attending a ceremony whether the whole hymn 
will be sung or just the first two verses. Arguably, the customs in different schools can vary 
and one cannot be sure of the end results when the guidelines on the subject are this vague.  
The Summer Hymn has become a source of significant debate in Finland and it has been used 
as a tool for nationalist populist politics. Those who have endeavoured to dispute the tradition 
of singing this religious song at school have been branded unpatriotic by members of the 
populist right-wing party, the Finns.285 In these debates, and in the stance adopted by the 
Constitutional Law Committee, the song is attributed strong cultural value. 
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I find that the main reason this hymn is still embedded into the communal cultural mind of 
Finnish people is because schoolchildren have been obligated to sing it every spring in school. 
Every pupil knows this song by heart. It should be possible to doubt the legitimacy of 
traditions and critically assess their religious nature. Especially seeing as removing the hymn 
to be sung solely in explicitly religious ceremonies, or offering pupils the option to opt out of 
singing the song in a manner that respects their right to negative freedom of religion would 
not be a concern for the positive freedom of religion of others.  
The difficulty involved of having a legal or societal conversation on the status of religion in 
schools is well illustrated by the episode that followed the 2014 resolution given by the 
deputy chancellor of justice. The resolution had very little to do with the Summer Hymn and 
did not propose banning of this hymn. Nevertheless, the public reaction fuelled in part by 
media portrayal of the issue was centred on the hymn and concern over a possible ban of 
singing it in school festivities. The deputy chancellor of justice became the target of abusive 
feedback.286  
After this public outcry, the CLC convened a hearing on the subject at the request of some of 
its members.287 This was a peculiar and rare measure for the parliamentary committee to take 
and it received criticism from legal experts. Ojanen opined that some of the members of the 
CLC felt political pressure to form policy different from the stance the deputy chancellor of 
justice had made.288 
Ultimately, the CLC gave a memorandum on the issue and stated that there was no need for 
any measures to be taken regarding religious practice in Finnish schools. 289 One apparent 
element of the memorandum was an intention to clarify what the current legal position was, 
and whether this required a change in stance regarding religious content in schools.290  
 Other religious content 4.2.4.
In addition to the practices highlighted above, other forms of religious content are often 
present in schools and are dealt with when complaints are made. Some schools still have 
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communal prayer integrated into their schedule although the legal stance on prayer in general 
school life is slightly clearer.  
Teacher-led prayer for example in the form of saying grace before school lunch is not 
sanctioned practice. This can be replaced with a communal moment for quieting down before 
the meal. This offers all pupils their own options for quieting down. If an individual pupil 
wishes to pray this is protected within the positive aspect of freedom of religion and therefore 
the prohibition of teachers leading prayer is not infringing on the pupils’ positive freedom of 
religion.291 Leading pupils into prayer within the daily activity of the school is therefore quite 
clearly prohibited religious practice.  
School festivities involving national holidays like Christmas and Easter are also problematic. 
Most content is again based on tradition such as the playing out or reciting of the Christmas 
Gospel, which is undoubtedly religious content. The Constitutional Law Committee, 
however, has defended the traditions of school year festivities. The Freedom of Religion Act 
does not require changes to schools’ festivities.292 Schools have different ways of trying to 
make these events inclusive for everyone and some include more Christian material than 
others. Some schools have put more weight on more secular holiday symbols and have 
attempted to downplay the religious context.293 Christmas and Easter have not been the main 
issue of legal debates but the remain a topic of debate within schools and pre-schools. 
4.3. Concluding comments 
As discussed above, the religious content in Finnish schools is not limited to religious 
education but includes a variety of activities. Most of this practice is explained by tradition 
and culture.294 
Schools have differing practices that are often based in a lack of understanding of what 
demands freedom of religion sets on state authorities and schools as such. There is a 
substantial amount of permitted religious content and practice in schools, especially within 
religious education. This can lead to some authorities or schools stepping over the line, 
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apparently by accident. This is effectively the consequence of vague guidelines given by the 
legislature. 
Finnish practice effectually complies with art 18 of the ICCPR in as much as the state 
provides religious education for the majority religion, but offers a possibility to opt out of this 
education according to the parent’s wishes. This is accomplished through official membership 
with a church. This meets the demands displayed in Waldman v. Canada.  
However, there are several difficulties that Finnish schools face when it comes to favouring 
religious practice of the majority religion. These difficulties can easily slip into outright 
infringements of freedom of religion. Schools and the public in general, including members of 
the legislature, have difficulty in perceiving this bias. 
Special care should be taken to ensure that teaching of the religious subject be done in a 
neutral and objective manner, as per the requirements of Leirvåg v. Norway. The obligatory 
subject can only remain obligatory if it in fact contains no religious practice. The singing of 
hymns and learning of prayers should not be included in education of this nature. As 
discussed above, the supervision of religious education in every school is not possible in a 
way that can make sure that all religious education is carried out with no religious practice 
included. This begs for a re-evaluation of the compulsory subject. Options include a free opt-
out system for all or significant changes to the contents of the subject.  
The oft-cited tradition does not constitute legitimate grounds for favouring one religious 
group over another. Defending religious practice with the grounds that it is tradition is not 
tenable from a constitutional perspective.  
As considered above, equal and non-discriminatory treatment of students is a principle of 
great importance in the public school system and as a human right in general. When adopting 
basic education curricula, the state parties must be especially mindful of discrimination 
issues, so that pupils are not divided into different groups or taught different subjects on any 
such grounds that are included in the categories of discrimination defined by human rights 
law.295 These are pronounced concerns when involving religious education, as religion is one 
of the categories of prohibited discrimination. 
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It remains unclear whether it is even possible for schools to include religion in their activities 
and realize this with no harmful repercussions to pupils. When schools segregate and group 
their students based on religion and in practice single out the pupils who are part of minority 
groups, they inherently create an environment that is prone to discrimination and bullying 
based on religion and can foster experiences of loyalty conflict.296  
Arguably, religion does have its place in basic education. For children to grow with 
knowledge and understanding of the world they live in and develop a tolerant and inclusive 
attitude towards others, learning about religions is essential. The larger question really is 
about how education on religion is carried out.297 Children should not be indoctrinated or 
force-fed beliefs, and religious education should not amount to teaching children how best to 
practice a religion inherited from their parents.298  
As indicated above, Finnish schools maintain a special status for the majority religion. This 
level of religious activities permitted in schools is apt to create a mind-set, in which the 
majority religion is the norm and exceptions from this are somehow less than. Options given 
to pupils who are not members of the main church are secondary in nature, in all the scenarios 
presented above. The nature of the alternative activities offered is loosely controlled and 
therefore the system offers a possibility and reality for great variance between schools and 
even classrooms. This lack of uniformity in practice offers more potential for discriminatory 
practice and makes oversight unfeasible.  
The Irish school system has been the subject of substantial worry for the CCPR. The 
substantial Catholic content in Irish schools is based on the state’s concept of ‘school ethos 
and spirit’. Just as the influence of the Catholic faith on Irish culture does not make it 
acceptable to include practice of Catholicism in Irish school practices, nor should the 
corresponding case be so in Finland. When religion strongly permeates schools charged with 
basic education, effective opt-out measures are not possible.299 
Alternative activities for students deviating from the main religious affiliation can easily 
resemble punishment. If pupils are made to wait in the hallway or stay at school doing 
homework during Christmas church, this may certainly seem like punishment to the pupils. In 
                                                
296 Leirvåg et al. Norway 20013, (e.g. 14.7). 
297 Álvarez 2011: On education and pluralism and different models of education. 
298 Evans 2008, pp. 462–465. 
299 Mawhinney 2007, pp. 399–403. 
  
 
71 
cases where most of the pupil’s friends are attending these religious events, there can be 
considerable social pressure to attend. For young children, the example of teachers and the 
majority of other pupils can have extraordinary impact. Segregating measures can 
undoubtedly have de facto coercive effects on children.  
With falling membership rates, the church will undoubtedly endeavour to include itself in 
young pupils’ education as an attempt to strengthen its role in society. Apparently, schools are 
more than happy to let the church take over some of the activities of the school day and offer 
additional content such as church visits, morning assembly, Hymn-quizzes etc. This leads to a 
myriad of religious activities permeating school life. This in turn is apt to create an 
environment where pupils are constantly segregated, pupils are singled out, opt-out measures 
are in frequent use and children are subject to alienation and discrimination.  
In light of the above, it is difficult to justify current practice and consolidate it with human 
rights requirements. As the deputy chancellor stated, religious content in school functions is 
incompatible with the realization of pupils’ rights and current practice should be amended.300 
When practice based on tradition turns out to infringe upon human rights, it no longer fulfils 
the functions it was meant to serve and should be changed. To guarantee the rights of all 
pupils, most of current religious practice should be removed from the school context.  
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5. Results and prospects 
5.1. Findings of the study 
The aim of this study was to provide a comprehensive view into freedom of religion as a 
fundamental and human right in Finnish and supranational contexts, particularly in the school 
as a public space, and determine how Finland complies with the requirements set by these 
rights. This study set out to map out what, if any, problems Finnish practice in schools has 
regarding the guarantee of freedom of religion, and also to put forward possible solutions to 
these problems. 
With the predominant role of the Evangelical Lutheran Church and its undeniable influence 
on Finnish culture, it is understandably difficult and, in part, inutile to distinguish between 
religion and culture. These concepts are intertwined. Culture is not a legal concept, and 
attempting to draw a line between culture and religion is rather fruitless. Nevertheless, some 
determinations must be made when we observe the legal aspects of religion. 
Most of the issues confronting Finnish schools relate to the adequate realization of the 
negative aspect of religious freedom: The right to not practice religion or practice religion 
contrary to one’s own beliefs; Also, the right to not divulge one’s religion (forum internum). 
It seems that the right of pupils to be free of religious content in schools has confronted a 
surplus of problems with the increasing secularism and multicultural school life. When all 
pupils no longer represent the same faith, current practices are continually more difficult to 
maintain.301 
National authorities and politicians are prone to defending religious practice with the concept 
of culture. Statements such as ‘the crucifix is a part of Italian culture’ or ‘the Summer hymn is 
a cultural tradition’ are admittedly true. However, the fact that an act or symbol is traditional 
or part of cultural constructs does not in itself remove the possibility that this element of 
culture also holds religious significance. Therefore ‘the crucifix is a cultural symbol, not a 
religious one’ cannot be held as true. Hymns are undeniably religious songs. The crucifix 
holds immense religious significance in Christian religions. These traditions and symbols can 
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also be cultural traditions, especially in countries where a religion and its cultural elements 
have a long tradition and a following encompassing the majority of the people.  
This study notes the colourful practices regarding religion that exist in everyday life in 
Finnish schools. I find that currently freedom of religion is not applied fully to all pupils. The 
central issue are the practical difficulties involving the segregation of students by religion and 
arrangement of opt-out systems regarding religious content in schools. Schools have not 
found truly delicate and neutral ways of dealing with these practices, nor are there any signs 
of this being accomplished in the future. Pupils are de facto forced to hold their religion, or 
lack thereof, public all through their time in compulsory education. Schools have no real way 
of making sure that pupils are not bullied or discriminated against by other students because 
of their religion or lack thereof.  
These are the central issues found in this study that are in direct contrast to human rights 
requirements: 
1) The limits to children’s self-determination. The state should take moves to facilitate the 
right of pupils within basic education to make their own decisions on which type of education 
they wish to attend: denominational religious education or the more neutral ethics education. 
The age of religious self-determination being set at 18 is too high an age. Children should be 
able to determine whether they wish to receive denominational or other education according 
to their own wishes at a much younger age. 
2) The segregation of pupils according to religion. The everyday practice of separating pupils 
into different groups on the basis of religion is directly in contra to the requirements of human 
rights conventions. One should not have to publicly state one’s religion. This is effectively 
done daily in most Finnish schools. This is related to large amount of religious content, 
specifically Evangelical Lutheran content, within schools that conflicts with state neutrality. 
3) The integration of religion into school year festivities. The nature of the traditions 
frequently present in school year festivities constitutes an issue. The function of the festivities 
is to foster communality and good cheer. If the nature of these festivities is apt to promote 
feelings of not belonging and effectively makes some pupils outsiders, the function of these 
festivities might be better fulfilled by a different approach. If schools were to drop religious 
connotations from their festivities, the discrepancy regarding the pupils’ rights could be 
eliminated. On the other hand it is very difficult to see this action doing any damage to 
inclusiveness or the effectiveness of human rights. This is the sensible action to be taken. 
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Conservative minded clinging to tradition for the sake of tradition might be appealing to 
some, but it cannot be satisfactorily justified in relation to human rights. 
5.2. Analysing Finnish policy 
The ordeal following the resolution made by the Deputy Chancellor of Justice in March 2014 
displays just how difficult and delicate the issue of religious content in schools truly is. The 
text of the resolution was in no way inflammatory, being a matter-of-fact legal opinion. Many 
took the resolution as a ban of singing the Summer Hymn, which was not indeed the point of 
the resolution. This led to a strange reaction from the parliamentary Constitutional Law 
Committee. The hearing held on the subject was indeed a highly irregular procedure that 
received substantial critique from the leading experts in constitutional law. The result of this 
hearing was a memorandum that was poorly grounded and peculiar in nature. This 
memorandum effectively shut down all conversation on the subject, and no move to alter the 
current practice has been made by the authorities. The guidelines of the Board of Education 
remain unchanged and therefore so does school practice. It is as if the resolution made by the 
deputy Chancellor of Justice had no real effect.  
In light of this case, as a parliamentary body, the CLC seems to be vulnerable to public and 
political pressure. The commotion involving the Chancellor of Justice’s call for re-evaluation 
of current practice was met with an effort to appease and calm the objecting public. 
This study shows, that within constitutional oversight in Finland, issues regarding freedom of 
religion in schools have been examined with appropriate diligence. The CLC has evaluated 
issues utilizing legal scholars, constitutional observation, and relevant jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR and the ICCPR. However, these issues are not dealt with satisfactorily. The 
parliamentary CLC is reluctant to offer change to the status quo.  
The resolution of the Chancellor of Justice’s office made in 2014 was a move in a more 
human rights minded, progressive direction. This resolution was met with a substantial public 
outcry, with many interpreting that the Deputy Chancellor of Justice Mikko Puumalainen was 
on a personal mission to ban the singing of the Summer Hymn.302 The Hymn carries much 
significance for many people and it has become some a sort of symbol of Finnish identity for 
some. The public discussion was focused on the issue of this one song, and mostly bypassed 
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the other issues brought up by the Deputy Chancellor of Justice. He found this lamentable, as 
he considered these relevant in regard to human rights requirements.303 
The CLC however did not find any reason to alter current practice or take any measures 
whatsoever in response to the resolution offered by the supreme guardian of law. The 
memorandum given by the CLC in response to the public discussion on the subject of religion 
in schools seems to have been given as an appeasement after the discussion followed by the 
resolution. This effectively constituted a burial of the critical resolution, as no measures were 
found to be necessary. The opposition of change in religious content in schools was very 
vocal in public, so this debate had to be calmed before the elections.  
The CLC is reluctant to recommend measures when current legislation already offers the 
means to deal with possible issues. The current act of religious freedom is a rather 
comprehensive one. The current practice in schools is not grounded in law but is instead a 
result of cultural conventions and tradition. There is no legal obstruction to removing 
religious content, other than religious education, from schools. Altering religious education 
would require reforming legislation. Morning assembly, although required by law to begin the 
school day, should not be religious in content. Nevertheless, the National School Board is 
unlikely to alter their guidelines or decrees unless the CLC emerges with a clear statement in 
favour of change. The resolution given by the Chancellor of Justice’s office has had no visible 
effect on the School Board or their guidelines after the CLC memorandum declaring that no 
measures are needed.  
School authorities often cite practical difficulties as the main reason for imperfect compliance 
with freedom of religion. This is an insufficient justification. Justifiable limitations to 
fundamental or human rights do not extend to practical difficulties. Most of these practical 
difficulties could be avoided altogether, if of the amount of religious content in schools were 
significantly reduced. Seeing as freedom of religion does not require the state to provide 
religious education and more than anything, human rights law encourages schools to 
minimize religious content304, it is difficult to see why these steps are not taken by 
government.  
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The state of Finland has taken notice of these issues but has not caught up with human rights 
demands. It is predictably easy not to see problems in what one has a subjective, familiar 
relationship to. If a person with a Christian upbringing but with a secular identity happens to 
enjoy morning prayer or singing hymns at school celebrations, it might be difficult to see why 
these traditions or practices might offend someone else, or why these are even issues that 
merit discussion. I believe this calls for a change in attitude especially within the legislature. 
One’s own subjective experience or even the experience of the majority is not what defines 
the implementation of a human right.  
5.3. Analysing the practice of human rights instruments 
This study also highlights the issues with the European convention system in dealing with 
value-loaded issues such as religion. Regarding freedom of religion in schools, this study 
displays the most common issues regarding this human right and it’s realization.  
As Evans points out, social pressure can have an enormous impact on children, especially 
when these children are of a young and vulnerable age.305 The ECtHR has not satisfactorily 
taken into count these elements of daily life, and what actual implications state practice can 
have on freedom of religion in cases where the voluntary nature of a certain practice 
enshrined in legislation is in actuality endangered because of social pressure or other such 
circumstances. Legislation on its own is not sufficient to guarantee freedom of religion if the 
practical implications are not also considered.   
In its memorandum, the Finnish CLC stated that the ECtHR awards a broad margin of 
appreciation in cases dealing with article 9 of the ECHR. The state does not have a strong 
incentive to critically assess its practice in relation to human rights, when it knows that if a 
case were to be brought before the ECtHR, it would very likely award Finland a broad margin 
of appreciation. The margin of appreciation doctrine in effect dilutes the effectiveness of 
human rights requirements, especially in regards to freedom of religion and other issues 
wound up in national ‘moral and values’.  
Effectively because of this broad margin, the CLC deemed it unnecessary to effect any 
change to the status quo. This displays just how problematic the margin of appreciation can 
be – the state knows it would not be sanctioned under the ECHR because of the broad margin 
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in these cases, so it justifies discrepancies with human rights law with the same margin of 
appreciation. Initially, the function of the margin of appreciation was not to allow states to 
violate Convention articles with intent. However, this seems to be the effect in this case. The 
state justifies its lack of positive action with the ECtHR’s use of a broad margin of 
appreciation.  
The CCPR on the other hand does not utilize the margin of appreciation. The CLC has not 
considered the ICCPR in this matter, other than to cite previous case law that has a direct 
relevance to religion in schools. The fact that the specific practice in effect in Finnish schools 
has not been the subject of such a case seems to be sufficient justification for lack of action by 
the government. 
The CCPR has dealt with significantly less cases regarding the role of freedom of religion in 
the public space, compared to the ECtHR. If a case involving e.g. morning assembly practice 
were brought to the CCPR, the outcome would likely be a call for state action to guarantee 
religious freedom as a Covenant right. However, even though CCPR resolutions are not 
recommendations, they lack the legal and diplomatic power of the ECtHR judgements. In 
general, ECtHR jurisprudence is considered more binding in the European context. 
5.4. Future prospects  
Most conflicts in schools on religious freedom and especially the application of negative 
religious freedom boil down to defining what the difference between tradition and religion is, 
and who gets to determine it. Also, who is to decide if a practice that is not explicitly 
mentioned in international law is to be considered religious practice? If there is no specific 
case law making the determination, is there a risk that the majority religion will always take 
precedent, and if so, is this acceptable? 
I would suggest that the state focus on neutrality and the adequate fulfilling of requirements 
of all pupils’ human rights. If a practice can be reasonably determined religious through an 
evaluation as objective as possible, and the removal of such a practice from schools cannot be 
deemed harmful to the religious freedom of students, it should be removed. There is no 
justified reasoning to include religious practice in today’s pluralistic schools.  
This study shines a light on the multitude of dubious practices of religious nature that Finnish 
schools engage in. The amount of practical problems schools face in assuring freedom of 
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religion for all are too numerous to amount to a satisfactory outcome under the current 
guidelines.  
This study shows the active and broad scope of the discussions related to freedom of religion. 
More research should be dedicated to the study of western inclinations to utilize freedom of 
religion to protect what is familiar and limit the unknown. The issues that arise in European 
states’ inclination to ban symbols and attire of the Islamic faith and in contrast, to defend 
Christian traditions and symbols in the name of culture, are especially noteworthy. 
Regarding religious education, issues would be resolved with the application of a common 
subject for all to replace current classes in religion and ethics. This subject should be planned 
well, as to make sure it does not conflict with the requirements made by human rights law. 
This would require an objective and neutral subject placing no special weight on any one 
religion. An arrangement of this kind would dispose of current conflicts involving the 
denominational nature of religious education and the vagueness involving varied practice 
among schools. With a clear curriculum for all with no room for deviation into religiously 
involved education, a new subject would make the segregation of pupils according to religion 
a non-issue. 
In 2015 a group of teachers brought forth a citizens’ initiative for new legislation, calling for 
one, unified school subject dealing with philosophy of life, instead of the segregated subjects 
currently taught in Finnish schools. The subject this group advocated for would have been a 
neutral, secular subject teaching pupils about several religions with no particular weight 
placed on anyone’s own religion. This initiative failed to get the required amount of 
supporters for it to have been brought to parliament. The changes mapped out in this initiative 
would have been more in line with the requirements of human rights law.306  
I find that future measures to guarantee a religiously neutral school environment should arise 
from initiatives made by the legislature. This would require a substantial shift in attitudes 
which does not seem possible under the current conservative government.307  
During the last few years under this government, front row politicians have made several 
statements undermining human rights. According to the Parliamentary Ombudsman, this 
government is having unprecedented issues with the Constitution and has endeavoured to pass 
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bills that have great conflicts with the Constitution and requirements of human rights law.308 
During a political climate such as the one we are experiencing, it is difficult to foresee any 
significant change in legislation or practice involving this specific issue. 
With the Summer Hymn and other traditions being so close to many citizen’s hearts as 
beloved tradition or a signifier of identity, it is obvious any reform would cause a significant 
uproar. Reform is nevertheless necessary in light of the requirements set by human rights law 
highlighted in this study.  
This study finds that Finland’s practice in schools is inadequate. As the office of the 
Chancellor of Justice has found, there are several issues that should be addressed, especially 
when it comes to religious practice in schools. The necessary discussion should not be 
restricted to the Summer Hymn, but encompass all the issues with religion in schools.  
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